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Paper Citation Record · LEDGER

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information

As of 9 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 100 of 131 outbound references and 0 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2607.08675.

A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.

pith.paper-citation-record.v1
2607.08675 v1

Coverage vector

measured 100 of 131 reference resolution

Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z

measured 100 of 100 standing notices

One-hop event checks from named stored sources.

Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00

measured 0 of 0 inbound itemization

Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links

measured 0 of 1 external citation measurements

A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.

Source: cited_works

Reference resolution

100 of 131 outbound references displayed

  • verified exact10
  • verified fuzzy85
  • unresolved4
  • parse uncertain0
  • malformed identifier0
  • metadata mismatch1

External citation measurements

No source-named external measurement is stored.

Outbound references

Observation 269758ae-2dd1-4b45-a40c-2452cb982e50 · outbound

This paper cites American Economic Review , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information American Economic Review , volume=

Reference 1

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.249416Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:d85ea404fd1ab7af6fa8e7791777a351268a996c64d57f49137dc5e0652c91e8

Observation c0416f84-b476-45d6-b9bb-8c3d4f93980c · outbound

This paper cites Annual Review of Economics , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Annual Review of Economics , volume=

Reference 2

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.210186Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:0195d8a37201f42edc205835fe3ce41c2036ab19b8f4a7fbf7afc15d2c9a8e1c

Observation ed501ad4-417a-4a88-9323-5deb9f845935 · outbound

This paper cites Sequential Bayesian persuasion , journal =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Sequential Bayesian persuasion , journal =

Reference 3

Resolution
verified exact
arxiv_id, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.040492Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:bc4629241cd0ff6639f6d8c4c7b548b87786a76e7fb6bece465ae0d80cc19148

Observation d0ab801b-ceba-4ee8-8ccb-cce4260e1579 · outbound

This paper cites SIGecom Exch.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information SIGecom Exch

Reference 4

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.356976Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:67e2a1913b69c142aa6d9dea8a9e6569baa2385a579c06680997042e7d038b68

Observation 44a5ec49-4286-41c9-833a-bbdee88631ba · outbound

This paper cites Persuading Voters , urldate =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Persuading Voters , urldate =

Reference 5

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.301670Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:8b7e2b1ad6915bd5042166f54bceae975ede12b3fcb38ab420e839a2ec51dc4c

Observation b07d4346-73e3-497a-b337-c6f06239d58a · outbound

This paper cites Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver , journal =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver , journal =

Reference 6

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.382561Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:d6b22a527d8872fe933118834879ec0065d9a62b36d9db329da8f823fa7211a0

Observation 5dc1e702-775f-4866-b622-f9c95fcb7f20 · outbound

This paper cites Unpublished manuscript, London School Econ , year=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Unpublished manuscript, London School Econ , year=

Reference 7

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.287671Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:124eb4ffd8f71f8f6c924c3793f5f388516969fac07c8af9c7419c554e7b5e19

Observation f261443c-5266-4225-a4cf-6d3162c18551 · outbound

This paper cites Private Bayesian persuasion , journal =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Private Bayesian persuasion , journal =

Reference 8

Resolution
verified exact
doi, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.028968Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:6a7f0544a3bd5d438a12c2ae31a2360f8a77ac902efad21494fdb76f614577b1

Observation b6cc78ab-f660-463a-89d7-693129400dba · outbound

This paper cites SIGecom Exch.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information SIGecom Exch

Reference 9

Resolution
verified exact
arxiv_id, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.023864Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:d45523033f9d13edfb150c70ea09a595c1a985c269e622b86de94906d8d9625c

Observation 09273fbc-9231-4052-b605-c71c0827e382 · outbound

This paper cites 2024 , eprint=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information 2024 , eprint=

Reference 10

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.217745Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:cbdd70bcf0ba30a193179dad0330dd799aff01325d352559393fcb681947d743

Observation 126ee8a0-e1f1-45e3-b2ee-5aca460a40ce · outbound

This paper cites AEA Papers and Proceedings , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information AEA Papers and Proceedings , volume=

Reference 11

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.219451Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:3e46ece3b595ab618a28c10ac42ffda3a2f28d8f9cbde92cbe7df01db1b8bb90

Observation b0911afd-e16b-4e4a-858f-df038a7c22cd · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Economics & Management Strategy , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Economics & Management Strategy , volume=

Reference 12

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.231947Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:d20168e68e472572fd3bbe54331ffaa7ced9aee2abcf469fd424f4af14a2e2a4

Observation a2d33a90-4dba-4f5f-99f5-12808a8745f0 · outbound

This paper cites Theoretical Economics , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Theoretical Economics , volume=

Reference 13

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.303631Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:51b7d6f41c743b2f5f59265f9ea7480ef74e9e8b9e711b17af4c7daf5f7c4da6

Observation 7c87f370-bc5e-43a5-b5ce-3f9940a2cb7a · outbound

This paper cites 2020 , journal=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information 2020 , journal=

Reference 14

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.230254Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:eb7afd9b67678eb354798c56bab3fbce857aa882589c2e581fa35c26a92f25b0

Observation d57e3d0a-a632-4585-b9c5-244e30b02692 · outbound

This paper cites 1926 , publisher=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information 1926 , publisher=

Reference 15

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.372802Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:5bd82443f5923d8f92686e851fced022b9dfc394435fd3e61501d9a0d9c9d43a

Observation 37945355-6b15-4584-9578-d5ef3e2f7888 · outbound

This paper cites Theoretical Economics , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Theoretical Economics , volume=

Reference 16

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.315655Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:b69240750ff5618b6dd89fc21ccedf361ee64cb040725b22919c6c789b80a0e2

Observation 25298947-3c68-461f-a880-3c0ee3389d27 · outbound

This paper cites International Journal of Game Theory , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information International Journal of Game Theory , volume=

Reference 17

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.292768Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:7315cd2f00c08cde3f22960f5fecf19108bb10064dd059aa3af29c3b25830a9a

Observation 7b34ddcd-d641-4f76-adc0-f17c2488670c · outbound

This paper cites Available at SSRN 4531654 , year=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Available at SSRN 4531654 , year=

Reference 18

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.317794Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:756af18830a95ec4e88f4a209ce763ef09861e9bd238026fea039f47ddf0f0e6

Observation 1ed10c57-1d64-48e0-99f8-6c36d52c89b2 · outbound

This paper cites Games and Economic Behavior , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Games and Economic Behavior , volume=

Reference 19

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.396836Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:133e28dba63d7871d4dc0368f990bfabee1eaf4b2c68168ae9c113189867696a

Observation 258ffa6a-0b82-485d-b85f-ba0eba759fae · outbound

This paper cites Mathematische Annalen , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Mathematische Annalen , volume=

Reference 20

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.299908Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:a3c63eb22242751d611d93a8f9275bcb35341272f60d8e0da305fe8bac07a30d

Observation 13ecef49-627f-4715-a4fb-c4d2b7fb5d28 · outbound

This paper cites American Economic Review , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information American Economic Review , volume=

Reference 21

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.312445Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:a564ce64781e3085cf19956d23edc6872af99380d9630960887f68b634b8c098

Observation 56781092-fd66-4ef2-b743-3913fc3669e0 · outbound

This paper cites Econometrica , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Econometrica , volume=

Reference 22

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.356186Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:d4d741f5c82a8ef40fc600dbb1cdff7d4c017e1e94e153458a1b2d38ee907469

Observation 873a386d-5603-4a2e-aac9-8f26a5c83088 · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Economic Theory , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Economic Theory , volume=

Reference 23

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.336374Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:1aba59de6132d96b2b6fabf3b4c811b45ef5e7ad1e06a218b6a4bb77ded07100

Observation 9e1384f1-92e7-49f3-9ea6-9fc2177d6abb · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Political Economy , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Political Economy , volume=

Reference 24

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.328638Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:db328afb4038fbd93b35e23d16e69a8f4dd7760d0e65769f980649381c37ecea

Observation 4ca43506-26cc-42ec-b630-e8b5b0e16fc7 · outbound

This paper cites Econometrica , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Econometrica , volume=

Reference 25

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.312128Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:6d98924aec2861579714167a0c5bd6fc9f227a5627948274e403538226b5fad9

Observation 162e4fc5-04c4-416e-b60e-f0bf62b1a4b6 · outbound

This paper cites Available at SSRN 3697335 , year=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Available at SSRN 3697335 , year=

Reference 26

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.337168Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:e73b6ed885463843b76b280ea916cb4eda3618207e65dc6c9037282334fe3a18

Observation 6b0bbad8-aa45-47c3-9426-f9bf649272d3 · outbound

This paper cites Bayesian Persuasion Meets Mechanism Design: Going Beyond Intractability with Type Reporting.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Bayesian Persuasion Meets Mechanism Design: Going Beyond Intractability with Type Reporting

Reference 27

Resolution
verified exact
local_arxiv, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.052868Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:e68db91982a777345865e32dd82752cf0cd9c5ac1484f4ab5efa628e62f965ba

Observation 14c71ff2-a48c-419b-bd29-dea5c0d4ee82 · outbound

This paper cites Preprint , title =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Preprint , title =

Reference 28

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.393444Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:d8e5b4ef09f3c77d93ffffea5b61503c5c9dbbbc30ee86837010b574dc68b534

Observation cca4cb63-348b-4f1e-9b17-8d74ecd808d7 · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Economic Literature , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Economic Literature , volume=

Reference 29

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.351879Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:1eca0b2b9591a0c41e25f5a0ca67219dbb0517683852f965411d4c7cfdd54ffc

Observation 2d7ead62-6662-48e7-8cbf-1a1a27b1ea97 · outbound

This paper cites 2022 , publisher=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information 2022 , publisher=

Reference 30

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.366575Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:d306ad9085934722c16b0c62dd961e077428df1a685dbe57f45f80aa5713519e

Observation 27c1d003-4a7a-4cb3-9da6-4afcce8b41ab · outbound

This paper cites Econometrica , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Econometrica , volume=

Reference 31

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.378623Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:4f4e1b689d16cacc4d99377cf25325e2974d5c0660197d413764f815d49b5e4b

Observation 78cbde6a-0cfa-45ad-9727-5fb7cd554eea · outbound

This paper cites Available at SSRN 3281132 , year=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Available at SSRN 3281132 , year=

Reference 32

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.291341Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:c50dcb462bce6d4a58ba4d39fcfe7700a64e1673a61c026ba6b478d12a074b22

Observation 0fdaf95b-10de-4878-bfe3-ecf25e6b4b74 · outbound

This paper cites Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality , urldate =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality , urldate =

Reference 33

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.269190Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:ffd7cd6a66ec5e104b3f9fa31afcdd6a786f3fa4ac81c899a277fc54bc88ac88

Observation 3c726076-83b7-4672-a424-40c94aeb73d4 · outbound

This paper cites Competing Persuaders in Zero-Sum Games.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Competing Persuaders in Zero-Sum Games

Reference 34

Resolution
metadata mismatch
local_arxiv, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.056350Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:e4bb869468fae1452e203c353c35d8c909a75f29621320b23429eef309e62f4b

Observation 40c635a9-6705-4422-8a58-00eef07d4e50 · outbound

This paper cites Games and Economic Behavior , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Games and Economic Behavior , volume=

Reference 35

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.301499Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:6d63a5ffdfe69e9325a34352d351d841799bcf389f7905eecacfaba1844c0327

Observation 58ccb820-7528-477c-acc2-78f4aa649ad9 · outbound

This paper cites The Review of Economic Studies , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information The Review of Economic Studies , volume=

Reference 36

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.339643Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:33b2fa23d27dfd9ca45e6b930f5d1f6c31a2dbf878a40ae9cda5981a70e1a8de

Observation 680022ac-1e7a-4403-bc4e-8be9ad140016 · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Political Economy , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Political Economy , volume=

Reference 37

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.357957Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:b7e24e5fdedc438976f613c0503d774af928f79e5420e97bd9184ab8390d1806

Observation f78f2098-d1cf-4a53-908f-c5b6c1a0fdb5 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Unresolved cited work

Reference 38

Resolution
unresolved
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.298295Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:98912c8a73f964f2cc90f5c085ce4b708499058eb98c3f3c42379987da08cb9c

Observation d0f4fbf6-8580-4066-9077-5dbbf222257a · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Mathematical Economics , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Mathematical Economics , volume=

Reference 39

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.246913Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:87010c503d19137769766f595cdf340ffe66c8de4cc486ebd1f55e24b17d6ce9

Observation c593f02b-c09a-4e10-bf44-e1ff23322ae1 · outbound

This paper cites American Economic Journal: Microeconomics , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information American Economic Journal: Microeconomics , volume=

Reference 40

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.279734Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:efeaf8c18a9109c82cf730d302eefba032b53aac84e0d779be5e3e6c11a5aa69

Observation 0b5c7719-00ef-4617-8ca0-b2d1b725ff9f · outbound

This paper cites 1970 , publisher=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information 1970 , publisher=

Reference 41

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.224904Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:c81761f7a0e96e93562ae6db5c93beaad72a6f5c1f8537d64240fd599c64245d

Observation efbd5394-9fd6-44be-8133-1f2cc14c0ee3 · outbound

This paper cites Annals of Economics and Statistics , number=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Annals of Economics and Statistics , number=

Reference 42

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.264404Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:d269e329cee65be386b171c3476b2ad19db27a3be512c11667573f50a2928bf9

Observation 782fa419-8c45-4bf7-853b-7bebbfdcec75 · outbound

This paper cites The Review of Economic Studies , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information The Review of Economic Studies , volume=

Reference 43

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.305490Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:548b1ab711a79154794a5f585f0b20a271552172115eaf277ca7a0df28687ce4

Observation 3f1c5cb1-4d15-4af8-a74c-7df7890fd419 · outbound

This paper cites Working paper , year=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Working paper , year=

Reference 44

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.330219Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:f521cfa0587e8ad5fabbe4a9428678b6653ee6ab49a0ff4364049407450a109c

Observation 8d66fc80-6cb8-4bbe-98ae-92956d7ebd64 · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Political Economy , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Political Economy , volume=

Reference 45

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.326897Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:44e2bbbf6253652e945fae3c3a55355a14aef96058dd650a503883c515b88337

Observation 6c91dd42-5690-4b14-a56d-1e3306b74469 · outbound

This paper cites Theoretical Economics , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Theoretical Economics , volume=

Reference 46

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.298050Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:08e03b1b30e335cbd5c631fd3b3eeb7e083a2250fcf789deabe337b6e6bf9d2c

Observation e918fa9d-e4e2-44a1-94a1-35e7c36672f9 · outbound

This paper cites Econometrica , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Econometrica , volume=

Reference 47

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.319605Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:f52ac2538b47989cf2d716d4e9c98941f60a7a40c77966d890fb2674be66e429

Observation 1a9dcfc0-447f-4854-9d0a-b7b18291d426 · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Economic Theory , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Economic Theory , volume=

Reference 48

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.367574Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:ed92d29d4dd7d50c10603ac0a7caa54437cce8458a2db1fb5e42bd45d26973a9

Observation 081f2e4f-dac9-4753-935d-4bbff08e5ebe · outbound

This paper cites Theoretical Economics , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Theoretical Economics , volume=

Reference 49

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.368257Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:059da20396c4d19e49052d687b4dbd0320df76a2af97eeccac7856af33210e83

Observation ec6c288e-8f29-4719-ac75-2eef532795dc · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Unresolved cited work

Reference 50

Resolution
unresolved
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.376928Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:8929115eb2afd9fc5c2d7c2043558ba7d29e3cb2a4a5c97c98f661a5fe3e3e06

Observation 4e043450-34b9-425c-8ddb-d8afbfefcb96 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Unresolved cited work

Reference 51

Resolution
unresolved
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.353446Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:dbd3fc4c0460c1e5da9edca8d5cdbc6fc988ad055276051165874f5f158145c7

Observation af33ed4c-db2d-4c83-bf68-0e291f55d16d · outbound

This paper cites The American Economic Review , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information The American Economic Review , year =

Reference 52

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.331860Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:81e580d20e6f942e5c7ff5b6d953758b2cc08b1d22e77bd0ef9ba235681881b4

Observation d3ad39bf-b0a1-42c1-ade9-69720645bcd0 · outbound

This paper cites The Journal of Law & Economics , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information The Journal of Law & Economics , year =

Reference 53

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.345963Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:1f8685c6a59a5aa07d42c3a65c6815151af88c816cf0edb3e7e3b6df478fe6d3

Observation 64f009c7-9969-463a-95f4-d3f772c31975 · outbound

This paper cites and Dubra, Juan , title =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information and Dubra, Juan , title =

Reference 54

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.310849Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:6ae8674eefccdac16b64f0d6328f4cd7b4489d1b187c5e88d6bbc6b92701c1a1

Observation 117c3760-6e67-45d6-97d0-f8793bcbb550 · outbound

This paper cites Accounting Horizons , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Accounting Horizons , year =

Reference 55

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.292966Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:42810d2f7586f59e61a23690117aab38c16eb89024b444a7fe8dfeee1947a2a5

Observation 3c270756-d79f-4cba-bd2a-40026a87d9f7 · outbound

This paper cites The Accounting Review , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information The Accounting Review , year =

Reference 56

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.273276Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:3d53c237f8aa428ed19d50315bc767527ef4f97e94a4d604e026a7f0916aab75

Observation 3b42f996-6056-4a04-8ece-cd9462d60328 · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Economic Theory , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Economic Theory , volume=

Reference 57

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.355237Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:37a17725ba1fdcb4585e62bf2ca71192b22cfeaea5927cf258f41f587825ef38

Observation 8b75932a-f497-4ccd-8e0d-483c6f46042a · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Conflict Resolution , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Conflict Resolution , year =

Reference 58

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.358874Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:eed56c71366d657afb47e27726cf3cf40cbd3b6708d86ef989799304f7761fef

Observation d1a01b5c-4bf9-4372-87cb-aa2527f21420 · outbound

This paper cites American Journal of Political Science , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information American Journal of Political Science , year =

Reference 59

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.310524Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:d7d0808fa0fd90e06d5bccf3d07ccc6db50b47049585d9417c583833a9720f97

Observation a15811cc-38dc-47d7-8bf7-07bbc2dbacd6 · outbound

This paper cites Political Behavior , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Political Behavior , year =

Reference 60

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.332696Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:163211bb9413ff24a34ce3017a3d4381e83c697b3414ce12f087b977cd0145f4

Observation 95c1706d-1ca3-4e57-a77d-3dce64dc9d7c · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Marketing Communications , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Marketing Communications , year =

Reference 61

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.247339Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:6cbe692210ced6e08bd35c043ef5d0a8ef559c46a55de105b875f8a29f430f83

Observation 21697ab0-362c-4e52-b801-16a019a81d0b · outbound

This paper cites American Political Science Review , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information American Political Science Review , year =

Reference 62

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.364908Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:bd33599023b5f4d24ce23dc34d041678fcb7cafff362eebdfebb5993b006ce6c

Observation 77395c00-3ff9-447f-ba6a-fb41ae246d26 · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Applied Social Psychology , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Applied Social Psychology , year =

Reference 63

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.268149Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:f512acf32818673dba8781443067f3edcb6d77b34ef3aaaae744a4bc4fab94f1

Observation 35058a2f-93cb-43bd-8c91-7f50d61a27d5 · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Empirical Generalizations in Marketing , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Empirical Generalizations in Marketing , year =

Reference 64

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.208445Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:f342c96677363cea5b73ca6050f929d64dd9c34dd33ff134afa08ec21f6d9cce

Observation ec793bd8-675f-4310-a65a-e1347b98f6b2 · outbound

This paper cites 2010 , author =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information 2010 , author =

Reference 65

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.352628Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:f3e24cf0b6b1ced748045e0f57b73fa69896f3a32e87d65fbf9516de9eec8ef2

Observation 223a69e0-d77c-4e67-a7b1-e44b90223b00 · outbound

This paper cites The Quarterly Journal of Economics , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information The Quarterly Journal of Economics , year =

Reference 66

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.385994Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:9187f5eb134477bbd2883506e67e960ae2f76e2d91e4145376f7f5d17ca44b6b

Observation e74b285d-4979-48f3-b219-4dd4b40a1670 · outbound

This paper cites The Bell Journal of Economics , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information The Bell Journal of Economics , year =

Reference 67

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.395184Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:6b223bc5ab52d08e5c2e556751b090705fd5bd97e7918c8d3a99d0290ff94893

Observation bf2992be-a64b-4c4a-860a-966d58280ac4 · outbound

This paper cites The Accounting Review , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information The Accounting Review , year =

Reference 68

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.231785Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:0394b98e4f7c27add463f2196d261bb5d37214c0e65c15f0b2c008aff52fbf2f

Observation a0bbac86-a786-4437-9622-9a587e1db0ea · outbound

This paper cites 1995 , author =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information 1995 , author =

Reference 69

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.258870Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:f235dc9f228cb2988ce80ede18e5e380cd8f0e814ad2036cf7e2a76745204e75

Observation f9681a54-9ccf-4976-ad78-2f9bee3a51e8 · outbound

This paper cites American Economic Review , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information American Economic Review , year =

Reference 70

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.308928Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:c6a526d9ea30610280bb9f7cfc2332f2dc3202a31c9c9a67b91e9e9994668c50

Observation a3adc8e2-2f9f-4b19-beca-66ac5a42af10 · outbound

This paper cites Econometric Society 10th World Congress , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Econometric Society 10th World Congress , year =

Reference 71

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.267385Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:702ee791e9596fb263ad4a17c1b645a8dfd89857a61d2507583562b22a48c80a

Observation ce0c683c-1eba-49ac-9d98-175c51e9d1d8 · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Political Economy , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Political Economy , year =

Reference 72

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.314045Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:03e1e7b86b1d5f84f74b52adbc5e714a12c6020268359316fdfd81f52338cae8

Observation 6ebd1ccd-71e6-45c5-9da2-38c76480eb70 · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Economic Theory , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Economic Theory , year =

Reference 73

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.323043Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:9ec7869024d7fb50ff562d20bc87f15654a79da39ad42f94195d98a0356e2453

Observation aca94e58-346f-41cb-b353-abc7494117b1 · outbound

This paper cites Persuading voters , journal =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Persuading voters , journal =

Reference 74

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.321322Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:acafb3c70c3adbc080c7e58ab7192f99a6fd07a20247d6cbdb15c9c61841accf

Observation 67b670c7-752a-484a-af23-041a866f707b · outbound

This paper cites Econometrica , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Econometrica , year =

Reference 75

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.307181Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:cb6db28d67a8c4de8ee557612167534ad85cc42a56bf27f69d055c38bd93b895

Observation 20f0a01b-c34a-4aa1-8c9b-ba1a233a811f · outbound

This paper cites American Economic Journal: Microeconomics , Volume =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information American Economic Journal: Microeconomics , Volume =

Reference 76

Resolution
verified exact
doi, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.035741Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:ec5e617151e956acf0c4cf4468fd4c0b11d1c7e442d8421354b9534a4050f435

Observation 18f0338c-cf17-4387-895c-7d89b5e7d33a · outbound

This paper cites Robust implementation in general mechanisms , journal =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Robust implementation in general mechanisms , journal =

Reference 77

Resolution
verified exact
doi, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.041774Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:9c8f5fd07aea6ce516f81ce04898265f4a5b8a0e3b5cf588eee66887d064b78a

Observation 95fdfed8-0cd2-470d-9bb2-5feee525e803 · outbound

This paper cites Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk , urldate =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk , urldate =

Reference 78

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.324768Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:1730607791f1c92a9682f9234c6993ead96d097b4cb08c1077dc089579b5073c

Observation f475c5d1-a93a-43ea-8ce0-6bb657874564 · outbound

This paper cites American Economic Journal: Microeconomics , year=2019, volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information American Economic Journal: Microeconomics , year=2019, volume=

Reference 79

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.347705Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:bbe66211618795752d1d5b7c2ed56f029b0001233ceba1ccba0cc69b28683000

Observation 5813d252-e7ea-49ff-bebe-6045944b8b2b · outbound

This paper cites Theoretical Economics , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Theoretical Economics , year =

Reference 80

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.389789Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:18ca8174c422ab206f0f2360051d924a4cc449e49db1dd3fcd439b0f4e0c2423

Observation a801d055-4c5d-4802-800a-6bed9b4188e2 · outbound

This paper cites Available at SSRN 1868066 , year=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Available at SSRN 1868066 , year=

Reference 81

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.281516Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:71e279137d2fa5db82310e1b89847ffcf3a4a5f7b5034b9d04a2b4a4a8591d4a

Observation e4406323-d537-4523-95c4-ce8b79b15117 · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Economic Literature , Volume =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Economic Literature , Volume =

Reference 82

Resolution
verified exact
doi, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.034525Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:9a24f35fcee3b33847f3af8db09f65abf4cd73e26522a5c92678b0ef32b0affd

Observation e718b9de-32f7-4382-a868-4ddd4c82d367 · outbound

This paper cites American Economic Review , Volume =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information American Economic Review , Volume =

Reference 83

Resolution
verified exact
doi, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.033419Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:ed5530a0b4512b68ad71cd72a0aa7f10100094b7e2f2c3220c6d8d76842c3c28

Observation 6eed5cab-4c84-4b1f-ac14-5e499b226f87 · outbound

This paper cites American Economic Review , Volume =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information American Economic Review , Volume =

Reference 84

Resolution
verified exact
doi, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.028126Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:4a1312cd99ae4e541aab072a411e7ad13da40c148763ce8824c6bf68ba17ea30

Observation a79e64bf-166d-4ac1-bfdc-9c3b3cd87c26 · outbound

This paper cites Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure , journal =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure , journal =

Reference 85

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.371852Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:f6d23aeb094a2dc086538e43286feaaa2ef0c8d38b437931e16b2dd23aad9987

Observation 075c4bf2-f25a-40e9-a40d-893f17376380 · outbound

This paper cites Full revelation of information in Sender--Receiver games of persuasion , journal =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Full revelation of information in Sender--Receiver games of persuasion , journal =

Reference 86

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.345003Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:fe773f81741a0aa18c680779a15459fa8f3304d8b952eeb631a5a2e155ba223f

Observation 36fb106a-0035-4c07-855d-45286d437ea5 · outbound

This paper cites A definition , author=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information A definition , author=

Reference 87

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.331037Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:705354b008af50e94555e7c71c8ee9dd1cdb5fbf82a623f7476d03d327a01dd4

Observation d26d9b9e-a2a3-4363-9d04-4c89ab34a026 · outbound

This paper cites American Economic Review , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information American Economic Review , volume=

Reference 88

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.263516Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:95c3865ff88fd7261b309b8012b1b7aa296484d94fccb561e27b53c4b8320da8

Observation b657126e-6e9c-49ed-93eb-26d2a1fd5146 · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Economic Theory , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Economic Theory , year =

Reference 89

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.380486Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:93f67ac0a09bb6a698be73949fc81b0f8a9610dc23cdda949fa34062e4475b57

Observation b3e07c51-0d02-4623-b8ab-61f14286b49c · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Unresolved cited work

Reference 90

Resolution
unresolved
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.294755Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:5e86a06e4fb39622b1b86b093f3ee5d6b871488096b87f41e826b7bd1d2f97b8

Observation 846a6176-e581-4e8e-a75a-8872dfe28686 · outbound

This paper cites Dynamic sender--receiver games , journal =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Dynamic sender--receiver games , journal =

Reference 91

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.245543Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:5d68cefc06f78b9f995850772262c3ff8ccaf0ca4660f55355361f29931c6b13

Observation bc808483-8794-4fc4-8a9a-302fc93c7cda · outbound

This paper cites Journal of Economic Theory , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Journal of Economic Theory , year =

Reference 92

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.269891Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:731ca7745c98720f99e6936ce997ba59778d8e600c718909700f9f558579d613

Observation 227ee572-b140-4d76-a2a7-e730b109ae0b · outbound

This paper cites 2001 , author =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information 2001 , author =

Reference 93

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.360510Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:188e42512a9470bf22803dbad065634536ea66cd19912ed3341228955f085620

Observation 0b454938-bf2d-4a5f-b4da-53e3bb5fa5d9 · outbound

This paper cites Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society , pages=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society , pages=

Reference 94

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.350946Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:8dbb175f17b08406299c05b384343d90e625f9f16471ceea02146c2f85e27d40

Observation 96549173-c88e-4de7-b8ca-4f9e16ecebe9 · outbound

This paper cites Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society , pages=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society , pages=

Reference 95

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.187716Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:646cc5102456963c7d91445dae1ad864fbbbf05009065b90210707e2f2dbf854

Observation 1628233d-0f8e-4899-a004-b6c2a085da2b · outbound

This paper cites 2019 , MONTH = Jul, KEYWORDS =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information 2019 , MONTH = Jul, KEYWORDS =

Reference 96

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.364199Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:f86613e8b6dfc55912cf6e674e6a8281bef70f9a9171ddcbdd9d61b7406aa02e

Observation f11a028f-0d35-4271-944e-84c87e6124fe · outbound

This paper cites Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society , pages=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society , pages=

Reference 97

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.361389Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:752073666b05cf6666e99469c83002784dfa0ad0e61806e7c20d2ec02ddfe743

Observation 5b5b3949-2221-4d43-b0ab-9d5103559dac · outbound

This paper cites American Economic Review , volume=.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information American Economic Review , volume=

Reference 98

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.333502Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:6e251c72c70f9091880531ce9ce353274f59265e8e22f4a3395e4b12d3026b43

Observation 22cd9e92-8ffd-4295-af18-f2ca78dcc221 · outbound

This paper cites 2006 , author =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information 2006 , author =

Reference 99

Resolution
verified fuzzy
raw_fallback, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.285282Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:ce18f5c010b2a475e764a68be490c4686a0abab7fb9399de29d781680b1535e9

Observation b581b95e-a23a-4d3a-a899-d1ad2a5ca0d1 · outbound

This paper cites Econometrica , year =.

Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information Econometrica , year =

Reference 100

Resolution
verified exact
arxiv_id, observed 2026-07-10T03:36:44.044999Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-09T06:31:02.800959+00:00.

source=arxiv_source observed=2026-07-10T03:29:15.094776Z digest=sha256:3bd73f3c247483bbc502edd44c76df3f5d0ecb21574c488428a681d365010439

Pith citing papers

No inbound Pith citation observations are available.