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Compound V3 Economic Audit Report

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arxiv 2410.04085 v1 pith:UD4DUVYL submitted 2024-10-05 q-fin.RM

classification q-fin.RM
keywords protocolcompoundriskassetschainriskenablesfinanceinterest
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal

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Compound Finance is a decentralized lending protocol that enables the secure and efficient borrowing and lending of cryptocurrencies, utilizing smart contracts and dynamic interest rates based on supply and demand to facilitate transactions. The protocol enables users to supply different crypto assets and accrue interest, while borrowers can avail themselves of loans secured by collateralized assets. Our collaboration with Compound Finance focuses on harnessing the power of the Chainrisk simulation engine to optimize risk parameters of the Compound V3 (Comet) protocol. This report delineates a comprehensive methodology aimed at calculating key risk metrics of the protocol. This optimization framework is pivotal for mitigating systemic risks and enhancing the overall stability of the protocol. By leveraging Chainrisk's Cloud Platform, we conduct millions of simulations to evaluate the protocol's Value at Risk (VaR) and Liquidations at Risk (LaR), ultimately providing recommendations for parameter adjustments.

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Cited by 1 Pith paper

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  1. Economic Security of Multiple Shared Security Protocols

    cs.CR 2025-05 conditional novelty 5.0 of 10

    A formal model shows that fragmented multi-provider staking lowers the minimum attack cost to the weakest provider, while a unified stake pool raises it.

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