Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.
Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:09.218667Z
Paper Citation Record · LEDGER
Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising
As of 17 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 35 of 35 outbound references and 0 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2507.07418.
A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.
Coverage vector
One-hop event checks from named stored sources.
Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00
Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.
Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links
A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.
Source: cited_works
Reference resolution
35 of 35 outbound references displayed
- verified exact2
- verified fuzzy26
- unresolved7
- parse uncertain0
- malformed identifier0
- metadata mismatch0
External citation measurements
No source-named external measurement is stored.
Outbound references
Observation 9dbd6764-7cbb-4672-8b38-d7a0f89edade · outbound
This paper cites write newline.
Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising write newline
Reference 1
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:06.662390Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation a0a0afde-ff2a-4bea-b8ae-8e2d36563d56 · outbound
This paper cites Truthful auctions for pricing search keywords.
Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising Truthful auctions for pricing search keywords
Reference 2
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:16.149837Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.
Observation e0e7b171-1222-47b3-8cc8-3ccab4cc33cc · outbound
This paper cites Selling joint ads: A regret minimization perspective.
Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising Selling joint ads: A regret minimization perspective
Reference 3
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:15.857481Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.
Observation eff5076f-7b6b-4397-9bb4-76a289cd00d9 · outbound
This paper cites R., and Sivan, B.
Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising R., and Sivan, B
Reference 4
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:15.535816Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.
Observation 5c42c4c2-4160-4559-badb-5ea5331a32dc · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising Unresolved cited work
Reference 5
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:15.320260Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.
Observation 5062fd7f-3b20-41d8-af92-26fde6e20b5f · outbound
This paper cites and Sandholm, T.
Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising and Sandholm, T
Reference 6
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:15.079896Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.
Observation 6b587f65-60fa-42ca-bf71-b3a5d6be1113 · outbound
This paper cites and Sandholm, T.
Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising and Sandholm, T
Reference 7
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:14.791771Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.
Observation 7073fe05-6c2d-406f-8465-61d4adf8c64a · outbound
This paper cites Certifying strategyproof auction networks.
Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising Certifying strategyproof auction networks
Reference 8
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:14.556538Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.
Observation 622fbe39-0b02-4fec-aa2d-62ef86a92a0e · outbound
This paper cites Differentiable Economics for Randomized Affine Maximizer Auctions.
Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising Differentiable Economics for Randomized Affine Maximizer Auctions
Reference 9
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:07.069048Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation a3e1d0f5-1a0b-42e1-b7f3-7f1521839341 · outbound
This paper cites A context-integrated transformer-based neural network for auction design.
Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising A context-integrated transformer-based neural network for auction design
Reference 10
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:14.331483Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.
Observation 95d886c4-7223-420f-84dd-9ca8e573c3d2 · outbound
This paper cites A scalable neural network for dsic affine maximizer auction design.
Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising A scalable neural network for dsic affine maximizer auction design
Reference 11
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:14.133867Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.
Observation 65bd291e-e78b-48a5-9d46-bdd358280488 · outbound
This paper cites C., and Ravindranath, S.
Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising C., and Ravindranath, S
Reference 12
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:14.056004Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.
Observation 3879cd98-7143-4336-b943-3a0708cbdf4d · outbound
This paper cites Internet advertising and the generalized second-price auction: Selling billions of dollars worth of keywords.
Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising Internet advertising and the generalized second-price auction: Selling billions of dollars worth of keywords
Reference 13
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:13.907043Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.
Observation 49f570c9-8249-46aa-89af-c73557761312 · outbound
This paper cites Facebook collaborative ads, 2024.
Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising Facebook collaborative ads, 2024
Reference 14
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:13.735183Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.
Observation 5a810e88-23df-4d42-aed9-083694c83abf · outbound
This paper cites Incentives in teams.
Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising Incentives in teams
Reference 15
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:13.560406Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.
Observation d1e23295-7967-406a-9e6f-9b0c3d7a8475 · outbound
This paper cites Optimizing affine maximizer auctions via linear programming: an application to revenue maximizing mechanism design for zero-day exploits markets.
Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising Optimizing affine maximizer auctions via linear programming: an application to revenue maximizing mechanism design for zero-day exploits markets
Reference 16
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:13.464382Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.
Observation 8f5d5908-c9fe-4204-a79a-ebf37aae7e47 · outbound
This paper cites Optimal-er auctions through attention.
Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising Optimal-er auctions through attention
Reference 17
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:13.286143Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.
Observation d67a29f5-1a60-4326-8965-1694e6a1ee83 · outbound
This paper cites and Pennock, D.
Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising and Pennock, D
Reference 18
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:13.146234Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.
Observation 81c25aa0-b35f-4663-b59b-15e87257d3ef · outbound
This paper cites NMA: Neural Multi-slot Auctions with Externalities for Online Advertising.
Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising NMA: Neural Multi-slot Auctions with Externalities for Online Advertising
Reference 19
- Resolution
- verified exact
- local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:09.758561Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.
Observation 4a2d8719-38cb-4a48-9d63-2f2592e2b63e · outbound
This paper cites and Sandholm, T.
Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising and Sandholm, T
Reference 20
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:12.924491Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.
Observation 8941754b-3cc6-4384-a7e9-af5aba855964 · outbound
This paper cites Neural auction: End-to-end learning of auction mechanisms for e-commerce advertising.
Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising Neural auction: End-to-end learning of auction mechanisms for e-commerce advertising
Reference 21
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:12.794763Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.
Observation 695876f5-97a5-4e50-9675-b618b83b53d0 · outbound
This paper cites Joint bidding in ad auctions.
Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising Joint bidding in ad auctions
Reference 22
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:12.629354Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.
Observation 39ab37bc-9d12-444d-854b-9a25b6f14432 · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising Unresolved cited work
Reference 23
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:12.463588Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.
Observation 23d3387b-f9a9-4cca-8613-467771062f41 · outbound
This paper cites Preferencenet: Encoding human preferences in auction design with deep learning.
Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising Preferencenet: Encoding human preferences in auction design with deep learning
Reference 24
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:12.301689Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.
Observation 49d8b4d8-081d-407d-9025-9205419b1252 · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising Unresolved cited work
Reference 25
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:12.101276Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.
Observation 6f945cd6-d388-45de-b252-95e8ef1b3a0f · outbound
This paper cites A., and Key, P.
Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising A., and Key, P
Reference 26
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:11.927813Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.
Observation 860e9da6-0c11-422a-99ac-a14cba1bce5b · outbound
This paper cites The characterization of implementable choise rules.
Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising The characterization of implementable choise rules
Reference 27
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:11.703095Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.
Observation de503341-5455-4b47-9e7f-1bb1b84e8967 · outbound
This paper cites and Likhodedov, A.
Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising and Likhodedov, A
Reference 28
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:11.433802Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.
Observation 37f822dd-7ad1-4f21-9de3-a73595b21826 · outbound
This paper cites Automated mechanism design via neural networks.
Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising Automated mechanism design via neural networks
Reference 29
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:11.227497Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.
Observation b02b8f40-3c2a-48b8-9daa-9997b0237340 · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising Unresolved cited work
Reference 30
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:10.983118Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.
Observation 7209dee4-7112-4e2e-b00d-e35190d3ee28 · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising Unresolved cited work
Reference 31
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:10.704099Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.
Observation fa218c12-5977-4bd3-9c62-7f77da29d018 · outbound
This paper cites Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders.
Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders
Reference 32
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:10.473697Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.
Observation e13b7bb8-f05b-4284-b35e-c2e7b0a20fbb · outbound
This paper cites GemNet: Menu-Based, Strategy-Proof Multi-Bidder Auctions Through Deep Learning.
Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising GemNet: Menu-Based, Strategy-Proof Multi-Bidder Auctions Through Deep Learning
Reference 33
- Resolution
- verified exact
- local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:09.409727Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.
Observation 13477291-054d-42c4-be2f-5d08b0629180 · outbound
This paper cites Optimizing multiple performance metrics with deep gsp auctions for e-commerce advertising.
Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising Optimizing multiple performance metrics with deep gsp auctions for e-commerce advertising
Reference 34
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:10.193599Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.
Observation e5b59caa-c6fd-4723-89e3-7df9ffceb52d · outbound
This paper cites Joint auction in the online advertising market.
Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising Joint auction in the online advertising market
Reference 35
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-06T18:53:09.899010Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.
Pith citing papers
No inbound Pith citation observations are available.