Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.
Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-11T05:56:13.600805Z
Paper Citation Record · LEDGER
Matching Markets with Chores
As of 16 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 40 of 40 outbound references and 0 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2412.17134.
A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.
Coverage vector
One-hop event checks from named stored sources.
Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00
Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.
Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links
A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.
Source: cited_works
Reference resolution
40 of 40 outbound references displayed
- verified exact1
- verified fuzzy36
- unresolved3
- parse uncertain0
- malformed identifier0
- metadata mismatch0
External citation measurements
No source-named external measurement is stored.
Outbound references
Observation e3e0aa91-9e90-4d5a-aa0d-97621c71fb90 · outbound
This paper cites C omputing equilibrium in matching markets.
Matching Markets with Chores C omputing equilibrium in matching markets
Reference 1
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T05:56:14.113742Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 878a287f-0e40-4e35-bc6f-dfeccfe6a29e · outbound
This paper cites Fair division of indivisib le goods: Recent progress and open questions.
Matching Markets with Chores Fair division of indivisib le goods: Recent progress and open questions
Reference 2
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T05:56:14.097783Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 18998b81-f981-4bd9-9063-d58fc7f935ba · outbound
This paper cites Strategyproof multi-item exchange under si ngle-minded dichotomous preferences.
Matching Markets with Chores Strategyproof multi-item exchange under si ngle-minded dichotomous preferences
Reference 3
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T05:56:14.085685Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation dc5efb52-ad07-4bae-892e-8f2c1cd84dce · outbound
This paper cites Matching a lgorithms under diversity-based reser- vations.
Matching Markets with Chores Matching a lgorithms under diversity-based reser- vations
Reference 4
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T05:56:14.074431Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 0ff24353-ac26-497b-ade2-7dd367d6c33b · outbound
This paper cites From matching with diversity constraints to matching with regional quotas.
Matching Markets with Chores From matching with diversity constraints to matching with regional quotas
Reference 5
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T05:56:14.062903Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation a9c91968-424f-4c4c-9008-0c57ffc65cce · outbound
This paper cites Fair allocation of two types of chores.
Matching Markets with Chores Fair allocation of two types of chores
Reference 6
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T05:56:14.050922Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 01df63fb-4b0b-46b6-b32b-efed608390f7 · outbound
This paper cites Fair and trut hful mechanisms for dichotomous valuations.
Matching Markets with Chores Fair and trut hful mechanisms for dichotomous valuations
Reference 7
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T05:56:14.038575Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 0213d65c-4abb-49a6-91b6-3ba5f6d05f37 · outbound
This paper cites Swap dynamics in single-peaked housing markets.
Matching Markets with Chores Swap dynamics in single-peaked housing markets
Reference 8
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T05:56:14.026905Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation f3c9a3b4-57d2-48a6-a553-32d76af0602c · outbound
This paper cites A new solution to the r andom assignment problem.
Matching Markets with Chores A new solution to the r andom assignment problem
Reference 9
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T05:56:14.015069Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 06c2ad96-df2d-4dd4-9e29-3c50d6d32b5c · outbound
This paper cites Random matching und er dichotomous preferences.
Matching Markets with Chores Random matching und er dichotomous preferences
Reference 10
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T05:56:14.003700Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation e77371b9-e17c-4957-8383-fe6642d127ea · outbound
This paper cites Competitive division of a mixed manna.
Matching Markets with Chores Competitive division of a mixed manna
Reference 11
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T05:56:13.993063Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation f3cc3c86-a0cb-4faf-a4ca-add23ca847b8 · outbound
This paper cites The combinatorial assignment problem: Ap proximate competitive equilibrium from equal incomes.
Matching Markets with Chores The combinatorial assignment problem: Ap proximate competitive equilibrium from equal incomes
Reference 12
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T05:56:13.982436Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 5d10e7e9-e5bb-438b-8b3c-38bcb6ad20b2 · outbound
This paper cites Competitive equilibrium with chores: Combinatorial algorithm and hardness.
Matching Markets with Chores Competitive equilibrium with chores: Combinatorial algorithm and hardness
Reference 13
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T05:56:13.971742Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 76214b53-535c-4d50-8f6f-51771c9cb8bf · outbound
This paper cites Competitive equilibrium for chores: from dual eisenberg-gale to a fast, greedy, lp-b ased algorithm, 2024.
Matching Markets with Chores Competitive equilibrium for chores: from dual eisenberg-gale to a fast, greedy, lp-b ased algorithm, 2024
Reference 14
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T05:56:13.960204Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation ba394749-67e3-4916-a6e0-e192988fa148 · outbound
This paper cites Computational hardness of the hylland- zeckhauser scheme.
Matching Markets with Chores Computational hardness of the hylland- zeckhauser scheme
Reference 15
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T05:56:13.947720Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation c7438cdb-5165-4cec-b8ba-58c08ee5132b · outbound
This paper cites Fairness and efficiency trade-off in two-sided m atching.
Matching Markets with Chores Fairness and efficiency trade-off in two-sided m atching
Reference 16
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T05:56:13.934276Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 202133fa-d57e-42c1-9e8e-7c141793a1d6 · outbound
This paper cites How t o fairly allocate easy and difficult chores.
Matching Markets with Chores How t o fairly allocate easy and difficult chores
Reference 17
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T05:56:13.922991Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 564bb385-6c16-4a8e-a5a8-39b312fa3157 · outbound
This paper cites Fairness and efficiency for probabilistic allocations with participation constraints.
Matching Markets with Chores Fairness and efficiency for probabilistic allocations with participation constraints
Reference 18
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-11T05:56:13.512912Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation f5d15cbc-33c9-4db7-b05a-e4fb5bdd5ed1 · outbound
This paper cites C onstrained pseudo-market equilibrium.
Matching Markets with Chores C onstrained pseudo-market equilibrium
Reference 19
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T05:56:13.911089Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation e787fcb1-e563-4174-8aa3-e05aad9548fa · outbound
This paper cites Computing competiti ve equilibria with mixed manna.
Matching Markets with Chores Computing competiti ve equilibria with mixed manna
Reference 20
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T05:56:13.898803Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 26d14f5e-6195-4ce7-abe3-e4f5ece03eda · outbound
This paper cites Fair and effici ent allocations of chores under bivalued preferences.
Matching Markets with Chores Fair and effici ent allocations of chores under bivalued preferences
Reference 21
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T05:56:13.886841Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 39d8a047-452d-4474-9f79-fb9118c6d39f · outbound
This paper cites Weighted EF1 and PO allocations with few types of agents or chores.
Matching Markets with Chores Weighted EF1 and PO allocations with few types of agents or chores
Reference 22
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T05:56:13.875832Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 54d2f3b3-306d-45a8-80b7-09602fbfaf07 · outbound
This paper cites an unresolved cited work.
Matching Markets with Chores Unresolved cited work
Reference 23
- Resolution
- unresolved
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T05:56:13.865287Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 691bc4ba-0887-4b15-8efd-0aace6a7d2fb · outbound
This paper cites One-si ded matching markets with endowments: Equilibria and algorithms.
Matching Markets with Chores One-si ded matching markets with endowments: Equilibria and algorithms
Reference 24
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T05:56:13.852627Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 74485824-874d-47e6-9c63-b4a37fbc096b · outbound
This paper cites A survey on fair alloca tion of chores.
Matching Markets with Chores A survey on fair alloca tion of chores
Reference 25
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T05:56:13.840372Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 8fd5f213-53ed-4fda-a449-14df6772bd5b · outbound
This paper cites Stability in barter exchange markets.
Matching Markets with Chores Stability in barter exchange markets
Reference 26
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T05:56:13.828949Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation ada17e54-80fc-422d-9c06-1b36cfa7d908 · outbound
This paper cites A pseudo-market approach to allocation with priorities.
Matching Markets with Chores A pseudo-market approach to allocation with priorities
Reference 28
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T05:56:13.817536Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation aa540c1a-f8dc-40f4-8a0d-498af9dd5f0c · outbound
This paper cites Investiga ting the characteristics of one-sided matching mechanisms under various preferences and risk attitudes.
Matching Markets with Chores Investiga ting the characteristics of one-sided matching mechanisms under various preferences and risk attitudes
Reference 29
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T05:56:13.805205Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation fb22e46b-03df-4c10-b1b6-51982415a761 · outbound
This paper cites Nash-bargainin g-based models for matching markets: One- sided and two-sided; fisher and arrow-debreu.
Matching Markets with Chores Nash-bargainin g-based models for matching markets: One- sided and two-sided; fisher and arrow-debreu
Reference 30
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T05:56:13.792111Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation ddb12fe1-37b5-47bb-b2eb-ae222742ae30 · outbound
This paper cites The efficient all ocation of individuals to positions.
Matching Markets with Chores The efficient all ocation of individuals to positions
Reference 31
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T05:56:13.780089Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 6901392a-e5e9-4c9e-9cfc-07aa0f0d1931 · outbound
This paper cites Approximate efficiency in matching markets.
Matching Markets with Chores Approximate efficiency in matching markets
Reference 32
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T05:56:13.764740Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation e1f48cf5-8705-4aab-94ac-4cd6af326e18 · outbound
This paper cites Competitive equilibrium in the random assig nment problem.
Matching Markets with Chores Competitive equilibrium in the random assig nment problem
Reference 33
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T05:56:13.752173Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 8496fc45-3c83-4ccc-a1b3-90169a454e4b · outbound
This paper cites Mixed fair division: A survey.
Matching Markets with Chores Mixed fair division: A survey
Reference 34
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T05:56:13.740535Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 8f2a282e-57f1-4329-bb1c-e9a9e92dfdc0 · outbound
This paper cites Fractional matching markets.
Matching Markets with Chores Fractional matching markets
Reference 35
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T05:56:13.726839Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation 24deb02c-8e97-43ef-b8fb-fbac53d2a57e · outbound
This paper cites Efficient disposal equilibria of pseudom arkets.
Matching Markets with Chores Efficient disposal equilibria of pseudom arkets
Reference 36
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T05:56:13.714360Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation cee0191e-25f3-4be2-9001-1e3e09bec709 · outbound
This paper cites Fair division in the age of internet.
Matching Markets with Chores Fair division in the age of internet
Reference 37
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T05:56:13.700707Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation cdc21edb-569b-42ce-aeeb-879d1ce3a897 · outbound
This paper cites Time-Efficient Algorithms for Nash-Bargaining-Based Matching Market Models.
Matching Markets with Chores Time-Efficient Algorithms for Nash-Bargaining-Based Matching Market Models
Reference 38
- Resolution
- verified exact
- local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-11T05:56:13.650493Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation b2793084-6241-4fec-832f-275586b4e4b4 · outbound
This paper cites Cardinal-Utility Matching Markets: The Quest for Envy-Freeness, Pareto-Optimality, and Efficient Computability.
Matching Markets with Chores Cardinal-Utility Matching Markets: The Quest for Envy-Freeness, Pareto-Optimality, and Efficient Computability
Reference 39
- Resolution
- unresolved
- no resolver link, observed 2026-08-11T05:56:13.593269Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.
Observation 1cc01918-6092-4a15-a769-32d3eabb74cb · outbound
This paper cites Equity, envy, and efficiency.
Matching Markets with Chores Equity, envy, and efficiency
Reference 40
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T05:56:13.686700Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Observation d787f597-4b9d-4632-bdd8-9a7fbce03e51 · outbound
This paper cites Computationa l complexity of the hylland-zeckhauser scheme for one-sided matching markets.
Matching Markets with Chores Computationa l complexity of the hylland-zeckhauser scheme for one-sided matching markets
Reference 41
- Resolution
- verified fuzzy
- raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-11T05:56:13.675085Z
Source-reported events for the cited work
No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-16T06:30:59.297886+00:00.
Pith citing papers
No inbound Pith citation observations are available.