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Paper Citation Record · LEDGER

Learning to Incentivize Other Learning Agents

As of 17 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 0 of 0 outbound references and 2 inbound Pith citation observations for arXiv:2006.06051.

A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.

pith.paper-citation-record.v1
2006.06051 v2

Coverage vector

measured 0 of 0 reference resolution

Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links

measured 2 of 2 standing notices

One-hop event checks from named stored sources.

Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00

measured 2 of 2 inbound itemization

Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-15T19:37:03.146826Z

measured 0 of 1 external citation measurements

A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.

Source: pith, observed 2026-08-12T20:16:21.795629Z

Reference resolution

0 of 0 outbound references displayed

  • verified exact0
  • verified fuzzy0
  • unresolved0
  • parse uncertain0
  • malformed identifier0
  • metadata mismatch0

External citation measurements

No source-named external measurement is stored.

Outbound references

No outbound reference observations are available for this paper version.

Pith citing papers

Observation 911b91d8-105a-4600-ba7c-ba4a4efb2808 · inbound

InvestESG: A multi-agent reinforcement learning benchmark for studying climate investment as a social dilemma cites this paper.

InvestESG: A multi-agent reinforcement learning benchmark for studying climate investment as a social dilemma Learning to Incentivize Other Learning Agents

Reference 32

Resolution
verified exact
local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-12T20:16:21.803204Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-17T06:30:58.91139+00:00.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-12T20:16:21.602897Z digest=sha256:8b09ac03e5bf6fe758ff2644ba487814f7ba8b86d2469927b70bdaf285d9157d

Observation 80d17d91-c39b-40fa-88f4-d22eecdadeba · inbound

Fair Contracts in Principal-Agent Games with Heterogeneous Types cites this paper.

Fair Contracts in Principal-Agent Games with Heterogeneous Types Learning to Incentivize Other Learning Agents

Reference 34

Resolution
unresolved
no resolver link, observed 2026-08-15T19:37:03.146826Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

source=pdf_text observed=2026-08-15T19:37:03.146826Z digest=sha256:b5b5f8bf8303f129a34a96a999bafe376b65531f8270c1427587842992c8142e