Paper Citation Record · LEDGER

Incentive-Compatible Collusion-Resistance via Posted Prices

As of 11 August 2026, this Paper Citation Record lists 19 of 19 outbound references and 1 inbound Pith citation observation for arXiv:2412.20853.

A citation records a reference. It does not transfer a finding from one paper to another.

pith.paper-citation-record.v1
2412.20853 v1

Coverage vector

measured 19 of 19 reference resolution

Typed states for the displayed outbound observations.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-10T23:22:37.523958Z

measured 20 of 20 standing notices

One-hop event checks from named stored sources.

Source: scholarly_work_events, retraction_status_cache, observed 2026-08-11T06:34:44.6726+00:00

measured 1 of 1 inbound itemization

Pith citing papers itemized under the disclosed page cap.

Source: paper_references, paper_reference_links, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:08.475887Z

measured 1 of 1 external citation measurements

A source-named dated measurement, never combined with another source.

Source: pith, observed 2026-08-10T05:30:23.456663Z

Reference resolution

19 of 19 outbound references displayed

verified exact2
verified fuzzy2
unresolved14
parse uncertain0
malformed identifier1
metadata mismatch0

External citation measurements

2
pith, observed 2026-08-10T05:30:23.456663Z

Outbound references

Observation 97cc158d-6bfa-4aea-a64b-72dff1ae60f1 · outbound

This paper cites Core in a sim- ple coalition formation game.

Incentive-Compatible Collusion-Resistance via Posted Prices Core in a sim- ple coalition formation game

Reference 1

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-10T23:22:37.433045Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 0f83127f-db2b-468e-8c72-7897a5e7945c · outbound

This paper cites Bayesian Mechanism Design for Blockchain Transaction Fee Allocation.

Incentive-Compatible Collusion-Resistance via Posted Prices Bayesian Mechanism Design for Blockchain Transaction Fee Allocation

Reference 2

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-10T23:22:37.439959Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 9b2b6d8c-9183-4fba-ac17-367fb1b931da · outbound

This paper cites Collusion-resilience in transaction fee mechanism design, 2024.arXiv:2402.09321.

Incentive-Compatible Collusion-Resistance via Posted Prices Collusion-resilience in transaction fee mechanism design, 2024.arXiv:2402.09321

Reference 3

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-10T23:22:37.445259Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 6d967c04-ee01-4925-9977-f2c041a44a87 · outbound

This paper cites Foundations of Transaction Fee Mechanism Design.

Incentive-Compatible Collusion-Resistance via Posted Prices Foundations of Transaction Fee Mechanism Design

Reference 4

Resolution: verified exact; local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-10T23:22:37.996662Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-11T06:34:44.6726+00:00.

Observation 93a58fbe-71fb-4505-8480-9334f8fd3790 · outbound

This paper cites Foundations of Transaction Fee Mechanism De- sign, pages 3856–3899.

Incentive-Compatible Collusion-Resistance via Posted Prices Foundations of Transaction Fee Mechanism De- sign, pages 3856–3899

Reference 5

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-10T23:22:37.456008Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation d98a9669-c121-4b56-b3f1-a04fc1696f98 · outbound

This paper cites Censorship Resistance in On-Chain Auctions.

Incentive-Compatible Collusion-Resistance via Posted Prices Censorship Resistance in On-Chain Auctions

Reference 6

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-10T23:22:37.461307Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 111f0f76-af79-45f7-9000-247d9efb3715 · outbound

This paper cites Barriers to Collusion-resistant Transaction Fee Mechanisms.

Incentive-Compatible Collusion-Resistance via Posted Prices Barriers to Collusion-resistant Transaction Fee Mechanisms

Reference 7

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-10T23:22:37.467118Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 5a1788d9-c8c3-4adb-9ba6-2e94b531fabb · outbound

This paper cites Matthew Weinberg.

Incentive-Compatible Collusion-Resistance via Posted Prices Matthew Weinberg

Reference 8

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-10T23:22:37.472419Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 4885f48b-34c4-40a2-9103-9d9a15bd6207 · outbound

This paper cites Mechanism design and approximation.

Incentive-Compatible Collusion-Resistance via Posted Prices Mechanism design and approximation

Reference 9

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T23:22:38.136693Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-11T06:34:44.6726+00:00.

Observation a19a9a42-fd36-46cb-a3d5-735748d60f8e · outbound

This paper cites Redesigning bitcoin’s fee market.

Incentive-Compatible Collusion-Resistance via Posted Prices Redesigning bitcoin’s fee market

Reference 10

Resolution: verified fuzzy; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T23:22:38.120973Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-11T06:34:44.6726+00:00.

Observation d01fd39c-9723-4982-b440-c35fa133f247 · outbound

This paper cites Non-regular distributions, virtual values and monopoly problems (preliminary version.

Incentive-Compatible Collusion-Resistance via Posted Prices Non-regular distributions, virtual values and monopoly problems (preliminary version

Reference 11

Resolution: malformed identifier; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T23:22:37.859115Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-11T06:34:44.6726+00:00.

Observation 3681aea2-411b-4d12-a6cd-8235ec3989fc · outbound

This paper cites Optimal auction design.

Incentive-Compatible Collusion-Resistance via Posted Prices Optimal auction design

Reference 12

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-10T23:22:37.495949Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation fca29466-e4de-4848-8757-bc6885219a63 · outbound

This paper cites Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for the Ethereum Blockchain: An Economic Analysis of EIP-1559.

Incentive-Compatible Collusion-Resistance via Posted Prices Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for the Ethereum Blockchain: An Economic Analysis of EIP-1559

Reference 13

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-10T23:22:37.500780Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation ffdafb11-e8a3-4c60-9fc4-47ffa7f093d1 · outbound

This paper cites Transaction Fee Mechanism Design.

Incentive-Compatible Collusion-Resistance via Posted Prices Transaction Fee Mechanism Design

Reference 14

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-10T23:22:37.505603Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 3d8eb11e-c991-428d-873f-b225b3e287c1 · outbound

This paper cites What Can Cryptography Do For Decentralized Mechanism Design.

Incentive-Compatible Collusion-Resistance via Posted Prices What Can Cryptography Do For Decentralized Mechanism Design

Reference 15

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-10T23:22:37.510622Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation c5be685a-8560-4067-98c6-6112fc5d3569 · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Incentive-Compatible Collusion-Resistance via Posted Prices Unresolved cited work

Reference 16

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-10T23:22:37.515089Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Observation 2b626837-8ed2-45a5-84de-b35b29b887cb · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Incentive-Compatible Collusion-Resistance via Posted Prices Unresolved cited work

Reference 17

Resolution: unresolved; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T23:22:38.105437Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-11T06:34:44.6726+00:00.

Observation a79d6637-ccf6-47fd-9c1b-f234a8611435 · outbound

This paper cites A Constructing a Non-Regular Example for Collusion-free Prices In our Example 3.3 we wished to provide an explicit (and continuous) construc- tion.

Incentive-Compatible Collusion-Resistance via Posted Prices A Constructing a Non-Regular Example for Collusion-free Prices In our Example 3.3 we wished to provide an explicit (and continuous) construc- tion

Reference 1964

Resolution: verified exact; raw_fallback, observed 2026-08-10T23:22:37.735211Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-11T06:34:44.6726+00:00.

Observation 73bc6e2c-fbab-42b4-9d32-a479a739ba3f · outbound

This paper cites an unresolved cited work.

Incentive-Compatible Collusion-Resistance via Posted Prices Unresolved cited work

Reference 2019

Resolution: unresolved; no resolver link, observed 2026-08-10T23:22:37.486537Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

Unavailable: canonical work link unavailable.

Pith citing papers

Observation 6c007056-4452-4679-9ecb-438ce0fa9cde · inbound

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences cites this paper.

Order Auctions with Private Position Preferences Incentive-Compatible Collusion-Resistance via Posted Prices

Reference 20

Resolution: verified exact; local_arxiv, observed 2026-08-06T04:25:21.825112Z

Source-reported events for the cited work

No event found in the named queried sources as of 2026-08-11T06:34:44.6726+00:00.