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Security of quantum key distribution with imperfect devices
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We prove the security of the Bennett-Brassard (BB84) quantum key distribution protocol in the case where the source and detector are under the limited control of an adversary. Our proof applies when both the source and the detector have small basis-dependent flaws, as is typical in practical implementations of the protocol. We derive a general lower bound on the asymptotic key generation rate for weakly basis-dependent eavesdropping attacks, and also estimate the rate in some special cases: sources that emit weak coherent states with random phases, detectors with basis-dependent efficiency, and misaligned sources and detectors.
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Cited by 2 Pith papers
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Experimental quantum cryptography with single photons and imperfect devices
A 20-minute BB84 run with a quantum-dot single-photon source yields ≈2.2×10^6 finite-size secure bits under a security proof that explicitly includes beamsplitter, detector-efficiency, dark-count, and multiphoton unce...
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Security proofs for practical QKD: variations, techniques, gaps, and limitations
A critical review of decoy-state BB84 security proofs identifies common gaps and shows that no current proof meets the full standard of completeness, modularity, and verifiability.
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