Pith. sign in

REVIEW 1 cited by

Consistency of Local Density Matrices is QMA-complete

Not yet reviewed by Pith; the record is open.

This paper has not been read by Pith yet. Machine review is queued; the pith claim, tier, and objections will appear here once it completes.

SPECIMEN: schema-true, not a live event

T0 review · schema-true

One-sentence machine reading of the paper's core claim.

pith:XXXXXXXX · record.json · timestamp

arxiv quant-ph/0604166 v3 pith:244XH2N4 submitted 2006-04-21 quant-ph

classification quant-ph
keywords localconsistencydensitymatricesclassicalqma-completequbitsalgorithm
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal

Signed reviews

No signed human review yet.

0 comments
read the original abstract

Suppose we have an n-qubit system, and we are given a collection of local density matrices rho_1,...,rho_m, where each rho_i describes a subset C_i of the qubits. We say that the rho_i are ``consistent'' if there exists some global state sigma (on all n qubits) that matches each of the rho_i on the subsets C_i. This generalizes the classical notion of the consistency of marginal probability distributions. We show that deciding the consistency of local density matrices is QMA-complete (where QMA is the quantum analogue of NP). This gives an interesting example of a hard problem in QMA. Our proof is somewhat unusual: we give a Turing reduction from Local Hamiltonian, using a convex optimization algorithm by Bertsimas and Vempala, which is based on random sampling. Unlike in the classical case, simple mapping reductions do not seem to work here.

Discussion (0). Continue with ORCID to comment.

Forward citations

Cited by 1 Pith paper

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. Public-Key Quantum Authentication and Digital Signature Schemes Based on the QMA-Complete Problem

    quant-ph 2025-06 reject novelty 5.0 of 10

    A proposed public-key quantum signature scheme based on local density matrices, claimed secure via QMA-hardness, is broken by a simple re-signing attack and an invalid security reduction.

Pith tools