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S. Matthew Weinberg

Identifiers

  • name variant S. Matthew Weinberg 0.60 · backfill

Papers (29)

  1. Single-Item Auctions with a Monopolist Intermediary cs.GT · 2026 · author #4
  2. Adversarial procurement in blockchains cs.GT · 2026 · author #3
  3. Optimal (and Benchmark-Optimal) Competition Complexity for Additive Buyers over Independent Items cs.GT · 2018 · author #2
  4. A Duality-Based Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Design cs.GT · 2018 · author #3
  5. Smoothed Analysis of Multi-Item Auctions with Correlated Values cs.GT · 2018 · author #3
  6. Complement-Free Couples Must Communicate: A Hardness Result for Two-Player Combinatorial Auctions cs.GT · 2018 · author #5
  7. Bitcoin: A Natural Oligopoly cs.CR · 2018 · author #2
  8. Formal Barriers to Longest-Chain Proof-of-Stake Protocols cs.GT · 2018 · author #4
  9. Selling to a No-Regret Buyer cs.GT · 2017 · author #4
  10. The menu complexity of "one-and-a-half-dimensional" mechanism design cs.GT · 2017 · author #3
  11. Multi-armed Bandit Problems with Strategic Arms cs.GT · 2017 · author #4
  12. On Simultaneous Two-player Combinatorial Auctions cs.GT · 2017 · author #3
  13. Signal to noise in matching markets cs.GT · 2016 · author #1
  14. The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders cs.GT · 2016 · author #5
  15. A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements cs.GT · 2016 · author #5
  16. Condorcet-Consistent and Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules cs.GT · 2016 · author #3
  17. Revenue Maximization and Ex-Post Budget Constraints cs.GT · 2016 · author #3
  18. Parallel Algorithms for Select and Partition with Noisy Comparisons cs.DS · 2016 · author #3
  19. Simple Mechanisms for a Subadditive Buyer and Applications to Revenue Monotonicity cs.GT · 2015 · author #2
  20. Reaching Consensus via non-Bayesian Asynchronous Learning in Social Networks cs.GT · 2014 · author #4
  21. Bayesian Truthful Mechanisms for Job Scheduling from Bi-criterion Approximation Algorithms cs.GT · 2014 · author #2
  22. Prophet Inequalities with Limited Information cs.DS · 2013 · author #3
  23. Understanding Incentives: Mechanism Design becomes Algorithm Design cs.GT · 2013 · author #3
  24. Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization: Approximation Algorithms and other Generalizations cs.GT · 2013 · author #3
  25. Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design: Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization cs.GT · 2012 · author #3
  26. Matroid Prophet Inequalities cs.DS · 2012 · author #2
  27. A Constructive Approach to Reduced-Form Auctions with Applications to Multi-Item Mechanism Design cs.GT · 2011 · author #3
  28. On Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design cs.GT · 2011 · author #2
  29. Pricing Randomized Allocations cs.GT · 2009 · author #4

Mentions

  • 1501.07637 #2 · backfill · confidence 0.70 S. Matthew Weinberg
  • 1408.5192 #4 · backfill · confidence 0.70 S. Matthew Weinberg
  • 1405.5940 #2 · backfill · confidence 0.70 S. Matthew Weinberg
  • 1307.3736 #3 · backfill · confidence 0.70 S. Matthew Weinberg
  • 1305.4002 #3 · backfill · confidence 0.70 S. Matthew Weinberg
  • 1305.4000 #3 · backfill · confidence 0.70 S. Matthew Weinberg
  • 1207.5518 #3 · backfill · confidence 0.70 S. Matthew Weinberg
  • 1201.4764 #2 · backfill · confidence 0.70 S. Matthew Weinberg
  • 1112.4572 #3 · backfill · confidence 0.70 S. Matthew Weinberg
  • 1112.4006 #2 · backfill · confidence 0.70 S. Matthew Weinberg
  • 2605.21934 #4 · arxiv_oai · confidence 0.70 S. Matthew Weinberg
  • 0904.2400 #4 · backfill · confidence 0.70 S. Matthew Weinberg

Frequent Coauthors