Boundary mixed steady states in networked evolutionary games are characterized by boundary Nash equilibria in two-strategy cases and are generically unstable unless degenerate due to interaction structure among mixed players.
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In the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with trigger-restart, longer strategy lengths enable stability of cooperative strategies under replicator dynamics, with stable sequences requiring an initial 'hazing period' of defection and longer such periods having larger basins of attraction.
citing papers explorer
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On the Structure and Stability of Boundary Mixed Steady States in Evolutionary Games on Networks
Boundary mixed steady states in networked evolutionary games are characterized by boundary Nash equilibria in two-strategy cases and are generically unstable unless degenerate due to interaction structure among mixed players.
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Convergence of Replicator Dynamics in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Restarts
In the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with trigger-restart, longer strategy lengths enable stability of cooperative strategies under replicator dynamics, with stable sequences requiring an initial 'hazing period' of defection and longer such periods having larger basins of attraction.