Uniform-Ironed-Virtual-Value Item Pricing achieves a tight 3-approximation to the Duality Relaxation Benchmark in unit-demand single-buyer revenue maximization.
Matthew Weinberg , title =
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Simple mechanisms achieve arbitrary approximation to optimal revenue for bounded-support distributions with private budgets but cannot guarantee any positive fraction of optimal revenue for unbounded supports or certain bounded distributions, even under independence.
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Benchmark-Tight Approximation Ratio of Simple Mechanism for a Unit-Demand Buyer
Uniform-Ironed-Virtual-Value Item Pricing achieves a tight 3-approximation to the Duality Relaxation Benchmark in unit-demand single-buyer revenue maximization.
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Evaluating the Performance of Approximation Mechanisms under Budget Constraints
Simple mechanisms achieve arbitrary approximation to optimal revenue for bounded-support distributions with private budgets but cannot guarantee any positive fraction of optimal revenue for unbounded supports or certain bounded distributions, even under independence.