Proves a 0.778 upper bound on the revenue approximation ratio of ESP relative to MyeRev for i.i.d. non-regular distributions.
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2 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
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A monopolist facing a free capacity-constrained public option restricts its own output to induce rationing and extract higher payments, with derived conditions under which public capacity expansion benefits all consumer types.
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Separation between Second Price Auctions with Personalized Reserves and the Revenue Optimal Auction
Proves a 0.778 upper bound on the revenue approximation ratio of ESP relative to MyeRev for i.i.d. non-regular distributions.
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Luck Out or Outpay? Competing with a Public Option
A monopolist facing a free capacity-constrained public option restricts its own output to induce rationing and extract higher payments, with derived conditions under which public capacity expansion benefits all consumer types.