A k-secretary algorithm achieving the optimal 1-O(1/sqrt(k)) competitive ratio with O(log k) memory via a reduction to a new O(log k)-memory quantile estimator with O(sqrt(k)) expected rank error.
Combinatorial pen testing (or consumer surplus of deferred-acceptance auctions)
2 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
2
Pith papers citing it
verdicts
UNVERDICTED 2representative citing papers
In constrained multi-unit auctions, Myerson-style mechanisms are optimal for revenue-aligned objectives while buyer constraints enable strictly better outcomes for consumer-aligned objectives.
citing papers explorer
-
Optimal $k$-Secretary with Logarithmic Memory
A k-secretary algorithm achieving the optimal 1-O(1/sqrt(k)) competitive ratio with O(log k) memory via a reduction to a new O(log k)-memory quantile estimator with O(sqrt(k)) expected rank error.
-
Optimal Auctions for Constrained Buyers
In constrained multi-unit auctions, Myerson-style mechanisms are optimal for revenue-aligned objectives while buyer constraints enable strictly better outcomes for consumer-aligned objectives.