In a sequential review model, rewarding agreement between first and last report incentivizes early effort when reviews can overturn errors, while rewarding final accuracy works better when reports are copied; the choice hinges on the probability of repairing initial mistakes.
Moral Hazard and Observability
2 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
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Individual adaptive delegation-verification strategies aggregate via three extrapolation principles into sociotechnical lock-in modeled as a prisoner's dilemma that degrades epistemic standards unless mitigated by communicative standards and institutional norms.
citing papers explorer
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Washed Out by the Crowd? Accountability under Sequential Review
In a sequential review model, rewarding agreement between first and last report incentivizes early effort when reviews can overturn errors, while rewarding final accuracy works better when reports are copied; the choice hinges on the probability of repairing initial mistakes.
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The Human-AI Delegation-Verification Dilemma: Individual Strategies, Collective Equilibria and Sociotechnical Lock-in
Individual adaptive delegation-verification strategies aggregate via three extrapolation principles into sociotechnical lock-in modeled as a prisoner's dilemma that degrades epistemic standards unless mitigated by communicative standards and institutional norms.