An aggregate NTU stability concept using one-sided money burning decentralizes stable matchings in type-based markets and extends to a random utility model with proven existence, uniqueness, and convergent algorithm.
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Optimal redistributive segmentations induce the monopolist to charge higher prices to richer consumers and are implementable via price-based regulation.
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Aggregate Stable Matching with Money Burning
An aggregate NTU stability concept using one-sided money burning decentralizes stable matchings in type-based markets and extends to a random utility model with proven existence, uniqueness, and convergent algorithm.
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Redistribution Through Market Segmentation
Optimal redistributive segmentations induce the monopolist to charge higher prices to richer consumers and are implementable via price-based regulation.