In the seller-first timing model, deterministic seller mechanisms reduce to posted prices while the intermediary best-responds with a shifted Myerson auction, yielding arbitrarily poor seller revenue for regular distributions but constant-factor recovery for alpha-strongly regular ones, with timing,
Xu and Hao Zhu and Xuhui Zhou and Robert Lo and Abishek Sridhar and Xianyi Cheng and Tianyue Ou and Yonatan Bisk and Daniel Fried and Uri Alon and Graham Neubig , title =
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Single-Item Auctions with a Monopolist Intermediary
In the seller-first timing model, deterministic seller mechanisms reduce to posted prices while the intermediary best-responds with a shifted Myerson auction, yielding arbitrarily poor seller revenue for regular distributions but constant-factor recovery for alpha-strongly regular ones, with timing,