Strategically robust LQ dynamic games reduce to standard LQ games with penalized fictitious adversaries, admitting unique Markovian linear equilibria computable by coupled Riccati equations, with simulations revealing robustness benefits and a free-lunch performance improvement.
Training general- izable collaborative agents via strategic risk aversion
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Strategically Robust Linear Quadratic Dynamic Games
Strategically robust LQ dynamic games reduce to standard LQ games with penalized fictitious adversaries, admitting unique Markovian linear equilibria computable by coupled Riccati equations, with simulations revealing robustness benefits and a free-lunch performance improvement.