Moreover, for each ρi,v,I ∈ P , |ρi,v,I | ≤ O(|V |(|Π |+1)·(|Π |+|V |)) + (|Π |+ 1) · |V |

There exists a good symbolic witness P that contains a lasso ρ0,v 0,I 0 with cost proﬁle c, |ρ0,v 0,I 0 | ≤ M + |V |

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cs.GT · 2019-07-11 · unverdicted · novelty 5.0

Provides complexity results for deciding existence of Pareto optimal and high social welfare equilibria in multiplayer reachability games.

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On Relevant Equilibria in Reachability Games cs.GT · 2019-07-11 · unverdicted · none · ref 23
Provides complexity results for deciding existence of Pareto optimal and high social welfare equilibria in multiplayer reachability games.