In dynamic Stackelberg games with mid-game belief updates, assuming an incorrect follower best-response model can yield strictly lower leader cost than knowing the true model.
Equilibrium solutions in dynamic dominant-player models
2 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
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Causal PDE-Control Models combine causal drivers with PDE control and filtering to deliver interpretable dynamic portfolio rules that outperform benchmarks in Sharpe ratio and turnover on U.S. equity data.
citing papers explorer
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When the Correct Model Fails: The Optimality of Stackelberg Equilibria with Follower Intention Updates
In dynamic Stackelberg games with mid-game belief updates, assuming an incorrect follower best-response model can yield strictly lower leader cost than knowing the true model.
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Causal PDE-Control Models for Dynamic Portfolio Optimization with Latent Drivers
Causal PDE-Control Models combine causal drivers with PDE control and filtering to deliver interpretable dynamic portfolio rules that outperform benchmarks in Sharpe ratio and turnover on U.S. equity data.