Endogenous shareholding auctions are exactly the efficient, strategy-proof, envy-free, and voluntary mechanisms for a monopolist eliciting demand under production, with VCG producer-optimal and valvular auctions consumer-optimal.
``Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasi-linear preferences: ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects." Social Choice and Welfare 60, 103-120
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Endogenous shareholding auctions
Endogenous shareholding auctions are exactly the efficient, strategy-proof, envy-free, and voluntary mechanisms for a monopolist eliciting demand under production, with VCG producer-optimal and valvular auctions consumer-optimal.