In a sequential review model, rewarding agreement between first and last report incentivizes early effort when reviews can overturn errors, while rewarding final accuracy works better when reports are copied; the choice hinges on the probability of repairing initial mistakes.
Pierre Chaigneau, Alex Edmans, and Daniel Gottlieb
1 Pith paper cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
1
Pith paper citing it
fields
econ.TH 1years
2026 1verdicts
UNVERDICTED 1representative citing papers
citing papers explorer
-
Washed Out by the Crowd? Accountability under Sequential Review
In a sequential review model, rewarding agreement between first and last report incentivizes early effort when reviews can overturn errors, while rewarding final accuracy works better when reports are copied; the choice hinges on the probability of repairing initial mistakes.