Introduces sure, safe, and expected manipulability for voting method sets and computationally finds cases where uncertainty reduces strategic voting incentives.
In: Handbook of Computational Social Choice, Cambridge University Press, pp
2 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
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Parameterized complexity analysis of Possible President and Necessary President problems for Schulze voting yields dichotomies with respect to the number of voters.
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Strategic Voting Under Uncertainty About the Voting Method
Introduces sure, safe, and expected manipulability for voting method sets and computationally finds cases where uncertainty reduces strategic voting incentives.
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Navigating the Complexity Landscape of Nominee Selection in Schulze Voting
Parameterized complexity analysis of Possible President and Necessary President problems for Schulze voting yields dichotomies with respect to the number of voters.