A sender manipulates election outcomes via targeted uninformative messages that mimic exogenous voter signals, with influence rising in signal precision and falling in polarization; costly messaging leads to selective targeting.
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3 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
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UNVERDICTED 3representative citing papers
Optimal information structures in smooth games are those whose induced equilibria are also contractually implementable; targeted disclosure is robustly optimal with common values and linear disclosure is uniquely optimal with normal interdependent values in symmetric linear-quadratic games.
Optimal redistributive segmentations induce the monopolist to charge higher prices to richer consumers and are implementable via price-based regulation.
citing papers explorer
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Troll Farms
A sender manipulates election outcomes via targeted uninformative messages that mimic exogenous voter signals, with influence rising in signal precision and falling in polarization; costly messaging leads to selective targeting.
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Information Design in Smooth Games
Optimal information structures in smooth games are those whose induced equilibria are also contractually implementable; targeted disclosure is robustly optimal with common values and linear disclosure is uniquely optimal with normal interdependent values in symmetric linear-quadratic games.
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Redistribution Through Market Segmentation
Optimal redistributive segmentations induce the monopolist to charge higher prices to richer consumers and are implementable via price-based regulation.