Partner selection alters opponent distributions in policy-gradient dynamics, promoting cooperation when population variance exists, with a Wiener-process stochastic extension proving a sufficient condition and stationary distribution.
Title resolution pending
3 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
3
Pith papers citing it
years
2026 3verdicts
UNVERDICTED 3representative citing papers
Boundary mixed steady states in networked evolutionary games are characterized by boundary Nash equilibria in two-strategy cases and are generically unstable unless degenerate due to interaction structure among mixed players.
A new cooperative localization algorithm based on overlapping covariance intersection is fully distributed, provably recursively consistent, and scalable to ultra large-scale multi-agent systems without performance loss from ignored cross-correlations.
citing papers explorer
-
On the Structure and Stability of Boundary Mixed Steady States in Evolutionary Games on Networks
Boundary mixed steady states in networked evolutionary games are characterized by boundary Nash equilibria in two-strategy cases and are generically unstable unless degenerate due to interaction structure among mixed players.