Endogenous monotone scaling lets Kantian players commit to Nash-level or Stackelberg-leader payoffs in two-player games depending on whether actions are substitutes or complements.
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 112(1), pp.1-24
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In a two-agent public goods model with unequal endowments and logarithmic preferences, three barriers prevent voluntary Kantian cooperation: non-Pareto improvement for the poor under high inequality, parametrization choice as a source of distributional conflict, and coordination failure on a continu
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Moral Geometry: Endogenous Scaling in Nash-Kantian Games
Endogenous monotone scaling lets Kantian players commit to Nash-level or Stackelberg-leader payoffs in two-player games depending on whether actions are substitutes or complements.
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Three Barriers to Kantian Cooperation under Inequality
In a two-agent public goods model with unequal endowments and logarithmic preferences, three barriers prevent voluntary Kantian cooperation: non-Pareto improvement for the poor under high inequality, parametrization choice as a source of distributional conflict, and coordination failure on a continu