A dynamical model of repeated one-to-one matching shows that feedback between selectivity and realized matching rates produces stable asymmetric equilibria even for nearly identical groups.
Handbook of game theory with economic applications , volume=
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Rising skill premiums drive unique asymmetric equilibria in a symmetric marriage market model, causing one gender to invest more in skills than the other.
citing papers explorer
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Feedback dynamics in matching networks drive behavioral differentiation despite overlapping objectives
A dynamical model of repeated one-to-one matching shows that feedback between selectivity and realized matching rates produces stable asymmetric equilibria even for nearly identical groups.
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Skill Premia and Pre-Marital Investments in Marriage Markets
Rising skill premiums drive unique asymmetric equilibria in a symmetric marriage market model, causing one gender to invest more in skills than the other.