pith. sign in

arxiv: 2301.00237 · v2 · pith:MQPJHVS3 · submitted 2022-12-31 · econ.TH

Market Design with Distributional Objectives

Isa E. Hafalir , Fuhito Kojima , M. Bumin Yenmez , Koji Yokote This is my paper

pith:MQPJHVS3open to challenge →

classification econ.TH
keywords distributionalmeritadditionapplicationschoicechoosingfamilyobjective
0
0 comments X
read the original abstract

We provide optimal solutions to an institution that has distributional objectives when choosing from a set of applications based on merit (or priority). For example, in college admissions, administrators may want to admit a diverse class in addition to choosing students with the highest qualifications. We provide a family of choice rules that maximize merit subject to attaining a level of the distributional objective. We study the desirable properties of choice rules in this family and use them to find all subsets of applications on the Pareto frontier of the distributional objective and merit. In addition, we provide two novel characterizations of matroids.

This paper has not been read by Pith yet.

discussion (0)

Sign in with ORCID, Apple, or X to comment. Anyone can read and Pith papers without signing in.

Forward citations

Cited by 1 Pith paper

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score.

  1. Aggregate Stable Matching with Money Burning

    econ.TH 2026-05 unverdicted novelty 7.0

    An aggregate NTU stability concept using one-sided money burning decentralizes stable matchings in type-based markets and extends to a random utility model with proven existence, uniqueness, and convergent algorithm.