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Be Careful about Poisoned Word Embeddings: Exploring the Vulnerability of the Embedding Layers in NLP Models

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arxiv 2103.15543 v1 pith:VYFP46HC submitted 2021-03-29 cs.CL

classification cs.CL
keywords modelsembeddingsampleswordbackdoorcleandatalayers
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Recent studies have revealed a security threat to natural language processing (NLP) models, called the Backdoor Attack. Victim models can maintain competitive performance on clean samples while behaving abnormally on samples with a specific trigger word inserted. Previous backdoor attacking methods usually assume that attackers have a certain degree of data knowledge, either the dataset which users would use or proxy datasets for a similar task, for implementing the data poisoning procedure. However, in this paper, we find that it is possible to hack the model in a data-free way by modifying one single word embedding vector, with almost no accuracy sacrificed on clean samples. Experimental results on sentiment analysis and sentence-pair classification tasks show that our method is more efficient and stealthier. We hope this work can raise the awareness of such a critical security risk hidden in the embedding layers of NLP models. Our code is available at https://github.com/lancopku/Embedding-Poisoning.

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Cited by 2 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. Neutralizing Backdoors through Information Conflicts for Large Language Models

    cs.CL 2024-11 conditional novelty 4.0 of 10

    A trigger-agnostic defense that merges a backdoored LLM with a clean-data LoRA model and adds contradictory prompt evidence, reducing attack success while keeping most clean-task accuracy.

  2. A Survey on Backdoor Threats in Large Language Models (LLMs): Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluations

    cs.CR 2025-02 conditional novelty 2.0 of 10

    A literature review that taxonomizes LLM backdoor attacks and defenses by model construction phase, with no new experimental results.

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