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Preference Restrictions in Computational Social Choice: A Survey
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Social choice becomes easier on restricted preference domains such as single-peaked, single-crossing, and Euclidean preferences. Many impossibility theorems disappear, the structure makes it easier to reason about preferences, and computational problems can be solved more efficiently. In this survey, we give a thorough overview of many classic and modern restricted preference domains and explore their properties and applications. We do this from the viewpoint of computational social choice, letting computational problems drive our interest, but we include a comprehensive discussion of the economics and social choice literatures as well. Particular focus areas of our survey include algorithms for recognizing whether preferences belong to a particular preference domain, and algorithms for winner determination of voting rules that are hard to compute if preferences are unrestricted.
Forward citations
Cited by 4 Pith papers
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Algorithms for Structured Elections under Thiele Voting Rules
Thiele winner determination is FPT on Voter-Interval instances by max approvals per candidate and per voter, polynomial-time when each candidate has ≤2 approvers, and FPT by optimal total score.
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Practical approach to $2$-Euclidean Preferences
A suite of convex-hull forbidden substructures, reduction rules, ILP, and QCP recognizes 2-Euclidean elections quickly, solving 283 more PrefLib instances than the previous algorithm.
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Snowveil: A Framework for Decentralised Preference Discovery
Snowveil is a gossip-based decentralized preference aggregation protocol claiming almost-sure finite-time convergence and O(n) expected convergence time using a Borda-plurality rule.
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TTC Domains
On preference domains satisfying the top-two condition, TTC is the unique individually rational, pair-efficient, and strategy-proof mechanism; for up to four objects this condition is also necessary.
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