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Strategic flip-flopping in political competition

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arxiv 2305.02834 v1 pith:MZSGVDII submitted 2023-05-04 cs.GT econ.TH

Gaëtan Fournier , Alberto Grillo , Yevgeny Tsodikovich This is my paper · ORCID
classification cs.GTecon.TH
keywords informationcandidatesadjustmentsex-anteresponsewhenadjustallows
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We study candidates' positioning when adjustments are possible in response to new information about voters' preferences. Re-positioning allows candidates to get closer to the median voter but is costly both financially and electorally. We examine the occurrence and the direction of the adjustments depending on the ex-ante positions and the new information. In the unique subgame perfect equilibrium, candidates anticipate the possibility to adjust in response to future information and diverge ex-ante in order to secure a cost-less victory when the new information is favorable.

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