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Eating sandwiches: Modular and lightweight elimination of transaction reordering attacks
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Traditional blockchains grant the miner of a block full control not only over which transactions but also their order. This constitutes a major flaw discovered with the introduction of decentralized finance and allows miners to perform MEV attacks. In this paper, we address the issue of sandwich attacks by providing a construction that takes as input a blockchain protocol and outputs a new blockchain protocol with the same security but in which sandwich attacks are not profitable. Furthermore, our protocol is fully decentralized with no trusted third parties or heavy cryptography primitives and carries a linear increase in latency and minimum computation overhead.
Forward citations
Cited by 2 Pith papers
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Time Is Money: Incentivized Causal Transaction Ordering
A power-weighted randomized lottery with superlinear bid weights lets a user deter front-runners with a single bid that forms a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
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SoK: Consensus for Fair Message Ordering
A systematization of fair message ordering consensus that introduces a modular framework for adding fairness to BFT consensus and a latency-optimized variant of Themis.
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