REVIEW 5 cited by
Goal-Oriented Prompt Attack and Safety Evaluation for LLMs
Not yet reviewed by Pith; the record is open.
This paper has not been read by Pith yet. Machine review is queued; the pith claim, tier, and objections will appear here once it completes.
SPECIMEN: schema-true, not a live event
T0 review · schema-true
One-sentence machine reading of the paper's core claim.
pith:XXXXXXXX · record.json · timestamp
read the original abstract
Large Language Models (LLMs) presents significant priority in text understanding and generation. However, LLMs suffer from the risk of generating harmful contents especially while being employed to applications. There are several black-box attack methods, such as Prompt Attack, which can change the behaviour of LLMs and induce LLMs to generate unexpected answers with harmful contents. Researchers are interested in Prompt Attack and Defense with LLMs, while there is no publicly available dataset with high successful attacking rate to evaluate the abilities of defending prompt attack. In this paper, we introduce a pipeline to construct high-quality prompt attack samples, along with a Chinese prompt attack dataset called CPAD. Our prompts aim to induce LLMs to generate unexpected outputs with several carefully designed prompt attack templates and widely concerned attacking contents. Different from previous datasets involving safety estimation, we construct the prompts considering three dimensions: contents, attacking methods and goals. Especially, the attacking goals indicate the behaviour expected after successfully attacking the LLMs, thus the responses can be easily evaluated and analysed. We run several popular Chinese LLMs on our dataset, and the results show that our prompts are significantly harmful to LLMs, with around 70% attack success rate to GPT-3.5. CPAD is publicly available at https://github.com/liuchengyuan123/CPAD.
Forward citations
Cited by 5 Pith papers
-
SoK: Systematizing LLM Prompt Security: Taxonomies, Datasets, and Unified Evaluation of Attacks and Defenses
A systemization of LLM jailbreak security that adds linked taxonomies, an evaluation platform, and JailbreakDB, while its main attack–defense comparison results remain deferred.
-
LLM in the Middle: A Systematic Review of Threats and Mitigations to Real-World LLM-based Systems
A systematic review that categorizes LLM threats, severity scores, and mitigations across development and operation life cycles and multiple deployment scenarios.
-
An Empirical Study of LLM-as-a-Judge: How Design Choices Impact Evaluation Reliability
The reliability of LLM-as-a-Judge depends strongly on scoring rubrics and reference answers; sampling with averaging outperforms greedy decoding, and chain-of-thought reasoning adds little when rubrics are clear.
-
SoK: A Comprehensive Security Analysis of Jailbreak Resilience in GPT and DeepSeek Models
Across 510 HarmBench behaviors and seven attack methods, GPT-4 models show more consistent jailbreak resilience than DeepSeek models, whose vulnerability grows with scale.
-
Fine-Tuning Lowers Safety and Disrupts Evaluation Consistency
Fine-tuning small LLMs on benign data raises harmfulness scores, but those scores vary widely across random seeds, temperatures, and repeated runs, making single-run safety comparisons unreliable.
Discussion (0). Sign in to comment.