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Convergence of Multi-Scale Reinforcement Q-Learning Algorithms for Mean Field Game and Control Problems

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arxiv 2312.06659 v2 pith:YVSZ5RA5 submitted 2023-12-11 math.OC

classification math.OC
keywords convergencefieldmeanalgorithmalgorithmscontrolgamelearning
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We establish the convergence of the unified two-timescale Reinforcement Learning (RL) algorithm presented in a previous work by Angiuli et al. This algorithm provides solutions to Mean Field Game (MFG) or Mean Field Control (MFC) problems depending on the ratio of two learning rates, one for the value function and the other for the mean field term. Our proof of convergence highlights the fact that in the case of MFC several mean field distributions need to be updated and for this reason we present two separate algorithms, one for MFG and one for MFC. We focus on a setting with finite state and action spaces, discrete time and infinite horizon. The proofs of convergence rely on a generalization of the two-timescale approach of Borkar. The accuracy of approximation to the true solutions depends on the smoothing of the policies. We provide a numerical example illustrating the convergence.

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  1. Finite-Sample Convergence Bounds for Trust Region Policy Optimization in Mean-Field Games

    stat.ML 2025-05 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    Exact and sample-based trust-region policy optimization provably converge to approximate Nash equilibria in finite mean-field games with Õ(1/ε^6) sample complexity.

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