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Intention Analysis Makes LLMs A Good Jailbreak Defender

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arxiv 2401.06561 v4 pith:WNEJS26R submitted 2024-01-12 cs.CL

classification cs.CL
keywords mathbbjailbreakllmsintentionanalysisattackcomplexrate
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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abstract

Aligning large language models (LLMs) with human values, particularly when facing complex and stealthy jailbreak attacks, presents a formidable challenge. Unfortunately, existing methods often overlook this intrinsic nature of jailbreaks, which limits their effectiveness in such complex scenarios. In this study, we present a simple yet highly effective defense strategy, i.e., Intention Analysis ($\mathbb{IA}$). $\mathbb{IA}$ works by triggering LLMs' inherent self-correct and improve ability through a two-stage process: 1) analyzing the essential intention of the user input, and 2) providing final policy-aligned responses based on the first round conversation. Notably, $\mathbb{IA}$ is an inference-only method, thus could enhance LLM safety without compromising their helpfulness. Extensive experiments on varying jailbreak benchmarks across a wide range of LLMs show that $\mathbb{IA}$ could consistently and significantly reduce the harmfulness in responses (averagely -48.2% attack success rate). Encouragingly, with our $\mathbb{IA}$, Vicuna-7B even outperforms GPT-3.5 regarding attack success rate. We empirically demonstrate that, to some extent, $\mathbb{IA}$ is robust to errors in generated intentions. Further analyses reveal the underlying principle of $\mathbb{IA}$: suppressing LLM's tendency to follow jailbreak prompts, thereby enhancing safety.

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Cited by 3 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. SoK: Systematizing LLM Prompt Security: Taxonomies, Datasets, and Unified Evaluation of Attacks and Defenses

    cs.CR 2025-10 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    A systemization of LLM jailbreak security that adds linked taxonomies, an evaluation platform, and JailbreakDB, while its main attack–defense comparison results remain deferred.

  2. When LLM Defenses Backfire: Characterizing Safety, Performance, and Cost Trade-offs

    cs.CR 2026-07 conditional novelty 5.0 of 10

    Across 11 defenses, 6 open LLMs, and multiple benchmarks, rule-based defenses best preserve task accuracy, conservative self-reflection drives over-refusal, and multi-round defenses dominate inference cost.

  3. Beyond Surface-Level Detection: Towards Cognitive-Driven Defense Against Jailbreak Attacks via Meta-Operations Reasoning

    cs.AI 2025-08 unverdicted novelty 5.0 of 10

    A jailbreak defense that reasons about hidden manipulations in attack prompts, trained with supervised fine-tuning plus entropy-guided reinforcement learning, generalizes to attacks never seen in training.

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