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Neural Exec: Learning (and Learning from) Execution Triggers for Prompt Injection Attacks

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arxiv 2403.03792 v2 pith:7FXSHDWD submitted 2024-03-06 cs.CR cs.LG

classification cs.CRcs.LG
keywords triggersattacksneuralexecexecutiongeneratehandcraftedinjection
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We introduce a new family of prompt injection attacks, termed Neural Exec. Unlike known attacks that rely on handcrafted strings (e.g., "Ignore previous instructions and..."), we show that it is possible to conceptualize the creation of execution triggers as a differentiable search problem and use learning-based methods to autonomously generate them. Our results demonstrate that a motivated adversary can forge triggers that are not only drastically more effective than current handcrafted ones but also exhibit inherent flexibility in shape, properties, and functionality. In this direction, we show that an attacker can design and generate Neural Execs capable of persisting through multi-stage preprocessing pipelines, such as in the case of Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG)-based applications. More critically, our findings show that attackers can produce triggers that deviate markedly in form and shape from any known attack, sidestepping existing blacklist-based detection and sanitation approaches.

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Cited by 2 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. Fun-tuning: Characterizing the Vulnerability of Proprietary LLMs to Optimization-based Prompt Injection Attacks via the Fine-Tuning Interface

    cs.CR 2025-01 conditional novelty 7.0 of 10

    Attackers can use the loss signal from a remote LLM fine-tuning API to optimize adversarial prefix and suffix tokens, turning existing prompt injections into high-success attacks on closed-weight Gemini models.

  2. Security Concerns for Large Language Models: A Survey

    cs.CR 2025-05 conditional novelty 5.0 of 10

    A survey that classifies LLM security threats and argues that intrinsic agentic risks, such as scheming, are underappreciated and poorly defended.

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