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S3C2 Summit 2023-11: Industry Secure Supply Chain Summit

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arxiv 2408.16529 v1 pith:TBBQDE4E submitted 2024-08-29 cs.CR

classification cs.CR
keywords chainsupplysoftwareindustrysecuresummitsecuringstakeholders
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal

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Cyber attacks leveraging or targeting the software supply chain, such as the SolarWinds and the Log4j incidents, affected thousands of businesses and their customers, drawing attention from both industry and government stakeholders. To foster open dialogue, facilitate mutual sharing, and discuss shared challenges encountered by stakeholders in securing their software supply chain, researchers from the NSF-supported Secure Software Supply Chain Center (S3C2) organize Secure Supply Chain Summits with stakeholders. This paper summarizes the Industry Secure Supply Chain Summit held on November 16, 2023, which consisted of \panels{} panel discussions with a diverse set of \participants{} practitioners from the industry. The individual panels were framed with open-ended questions and included the topics of Software Bills of Materials (SBOMs), vulnerable dependencies, malicious commits, build and deploy infrastructure, reducing entire classes of vulnerabilities at scale, and supporting a company culture conductive to securing the software supply chain. The goal of this summit was to enable open discussions, mutual sharing, and shedding light on common challenges that industry practitioners with practical experience face when securing their software supply chain.

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  1. A Study of Malware Prevention in Linux Distributions

    cs.CR 2024-11 conditional novelty 5.0 of 10

    Linux distributions mostly rely on reproducible builds and signing, and current open-source malware scanners perform poorly on a new benchmark of malicious Linux packages.

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