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Exploring Visual Vulnerabilities via Multi-Loss Adversarial Search for Jailbreaking Vision-Language Models
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Despite inheriting security measures from underlying language models, Vision-Language Models (VLMs) may still be vulnerable to safety alignment issues. Through empirical analysis, we uncover two critical findings: scenario-matched images can significantly amplify harmful outputs, and contrary to common assumptions in gradient-based attacks, minimal loss values do not guarantee optimal attack effectiveness. Building on these insights, we introduce MLAI (Multi-Loss Adversarial Images), a novel jailbreak framework that leverages scenario-aware image generation for semantic alignment, exploits flat minima theory for robust adversarial image selection, and employs multi-image collaborative attacks for enhanced effectiveness. Extensive experiments demonstrate MLAI's significant impact, achieving attack success rates of 77.75% on MiniGPT-4 and 82.80% on LLaVA-2, substantially outperforming existing methods by margins of 34.37% and 12.77% respectively. Furthermore, MLAI shows considerable transferability to commercial black-box VLMs, achieving up to 60.11% success rate. Our work reveals fundamental visual vulnerabilities in current VLMs safety mechanisms and underscores the need for stronger defenses. Warning: This paper contains potentially harmful example text.
Forward citations
Cited by 3 Pith papers
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Visual Token Compression Enhances Robustness of MLLMs
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Coordinated misleading text descriptions of video, audio, and meaning flip the appropriateness labels assigned by most multimodal LLMs in about 90% of test videos.
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Pushing the Limits of Safety: A Technical Report on the ATLAS Challenge 2025
The ATLAS 2025 competition demonstrates that vision-language models remain highly vulnerable to flowchart-based and cross-modal jailbreak attacks, with top scores exceeding 93%.
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