Pith. sign in

REVIEW 4 major objections 5 minor 2 cited by

SoK: A Review of Cross-Chain Bridge Hacks in 2023

T0 review · 4 major / 5 minor · reviewed 2026-08-10 · deepseek-v4-flash

Challenge this review Re-run · record.json Download PDF Read on arXiv ↗

Pith's one-line read Cross-chain bridge hacks in 2022–2023 fall into two coherent classes—custodian attacks and communicator attacks—each with its own root causes and mitigations.

desk verdict A useful but incomplete taxonomy of bridge hacks; the omitted debt-issuer attack surface, exemplified by Wormhole, undercuts the 'comprehensive' claim. read the letter →

arxiv 2501.03423 v1 pith:EHNWI2CD submitted 2025-01-06 cs.CR

Nikita Belenkov , Valerian Callens , Alexandr Murashkin , Kacper Bak , Martin Derka , Jan Gorzny , Sung-Shine Lee This is my paper · ORCID
classification cs.CR
keywords cross-chainbridgesbridgesecuritycustodianattackscommunicatorblockchainhacksMerkleproofvulnerabilitiesprivatekeycompromisesmartcontract
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal

The pith

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The reading

Cross-chain bridges, the infrastructure that moves tokens between blockchains, lost nearly $2 billion to hacks since 2020, with the largest single theft taking almost $600 million from the Ronin Bridge. This paper argues that the attacks of 2022 and 2023 are not a random scatter of bugs but fall into two coherent classes: custodian attacks, which hit the on-chain contracts that lock and release assets, and communicator attacks, which hit the off-chain actors and logic that relay messages between chains. On this diagnosis, each class has identifiable root causes and associated countermeasures, so the analysis is meant to guide audits, monitoring, and industry-wide security standards. The value of the claim, if right, is that bridge security can be improved by hardening two specific components rather than treating every bridge as a bespoke case.

What carries the argument

The organizing device is the three-component bridge model inherited from the authors' earlier SoK: a custodian contract on the source chain that locks assets, a debt issuer contract on the destination chain that mints and burns the pegged tokens, and a communicator that observes events on one chain and relays them to the other. The paper then maps each reviewed hack onto either the custodian or the communicator, treating the debt issuer as not being the target in this period. The work the taxonomy does is to collapse many superficially different exploits into two attack surfaces, so that solutions can be stated per surface rather than per incident.

What would settle it

A documented 2022–2023 bridge hack in which funds are stolen entirely through a vulnerability in the debt issuer contract (for example, a logic bug that mints debt tokens without a corresponding lock or burn) while the custodian and communicator behave as designed would fall outside the proposed classification and show the taxonomy incomplete. Curating a list of such hacks would settle whether the custodian/communicator partition is exhaustive.

Watch

Extended reading notes

Core claim

The central claim is that a three-component model of bridge architecture—custodian, communicator, and debt issuer—accounts for the bridge hacks of the reviewed period, and that every analyzed exploit targets either the custodian or the communicator. Custodian attacks proceed by manipulating Merkle proofs (Binance Bridge, almost $600 million), exploiting missing input validation in legacy code paths (Nomad, about $190 million; Qubit Finance, about $80 million), or compromising admin private keys (Wintermute, about $160 million). Communicator attacks proceed by compromising validator private keys (Harmony Horizon, about $100 million; Ronin, about $600 million) or by exploiting voting flaws in the off-chain communicator network (Celer, up to $30 million at risk). The paper's contribution is the classification itself plus the observation that each class has recurring root causes—verification edge cases, default-value assumptions, legacy code, key management, and missing checks in off-chain logic—each of which maps to a concrete mitigation.

Load-bearing premise

The analysis assumes that every cross-chain bridge hack fits the three-component model and that every reviewed exploit is either a custodian attack or a communicator attack; if a real attack succeeds by exploiting debt-issuer logic, governance, or economic manipulation alone, the taxonomy and its countermeasures would not cover it.

Editorial extensions

If this is right

  • If the classification holds, security audits of bridges should treat the custodian and communicator as separate threat surfaces and dedicate specific checks to each: Merkle proof edge cases and default-value handling for the former, key-management and off-chain logic for the latter.
  • Upgrade procedures should be treated as security-critical, since the Nomad and Qubit exploits both arose from legacy paths that remained active after new functionality was added.
  • Monitoring and incident response should focus on communicator behavior, such as unexpected validator votes or large transfers, because the Ronin and Harmony attacks went undetected for days.
  • The pattern points toward industry standards like minimum multi-sig thresholds, key-storage requirements, and mandatory off-chain code review, which the paper explicitly calls for.
  • The Celer case suggests that bug-bounty programs need to cover off-chain communicator code, not only on-chain contracts.

Reading between the lines

Editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

  • One implication the paper leaves implicit is that the custodian/communicator split could be used as a checklist for automated vulnerability scanners, with each class of exploit mapped to detectable code patterns in contracts and off-chain services.
  • The paper's period boundary (hacks after its predecessor SoK) means the taxonomy is a snapshot; a testable extension is to apply the same classification to bridge hacks from 2024 onward and see whether new attacks still fit.
  • The repeated failure mode of "system as strong as its weakest component" suggests that economic incentives of communicators—rewarded for honest relaying, punished for malicious behavior—deserve as much attention as cryptographic and contract-level controls.
  • Because the debt issuer is identified as a component but no 2022–2023 attacks are assigned to it, the model implicitly predicts that bridges are most vulnerable where assets are locked and where messages are relayed; debt-issuer logic bugs may emerge as the next frontier if those surfaces harden.
Share X Bluesky LinkedIn Reddit HN

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, and a circularity audit.

Referee Report

4 major / 5 minor

Summary. The paper is a SoK-style review of selected cross-chain bridge hacks from 2022 and 2023. It first introduces a three-component bridge architecture (custodian, communicator, and debt issuer), then analyzes six incidents: Binance Bridge, Nomad, Qubit Finance, Wintermute, Harmony Horizon, Ronin, and Celer. Each incident is assigned to either a custodian attack (Section 3) or a communicator attack (Section 4), and each section ends with proposed countermeasures. The stated goal is that understanding these attacks can enhance bridge security and inform industry-wide standards.

Significance. If the classifications and incident narratives are accurate, the paper is a useful practitioner-oriented survey: it gives concrete, step-by-step exploit descriptions that are traceable to public incident reports, and it highlights a reproducible set of operational lessons (key management, off-chain code review, monitoring, and decentralization). The paper also makes a transparent connection to the authors' prior SoK in [4], which is appropriate for a follow-up survey. However, the contribution is closer to an incident compendium than to a systematic taxonomy: the paper does not justify the completeness of its two-category classification, contains a factual dating error for one incident, and does not specify an incident-selection methodology. These limitations currently constrain the strength of the claim that the findings can support industry-wide standards.

major comments (4)
  1. [Section 3.3.1] The paper dates the Wintermute hack to June 2022, but the cited references [27, 28] and all public incident reports place it in September 2022. Since this is a review whose value depends on accurate incident metadata, the date should be corrected and the chronology in Section 5 should be adjusted accordingly.
  2. [Sections 2, 3, and 4] Section 2 defines the bridge architecture as having three components—custodian, communicator, and debt issuer—and states that a communicator signature is mandatory for the debt issuer to mint. Yet Sections 3 and 4 treat only custodian and communicator attacks, and no argument is given that debt-issuer attacks are impossible or out of scope. The February 2022 Wormhole hack, which falls within the paper's stated 2022 window and is not discussed, exploited a missing signature check in the Solana-side minting contract, i.e. the debt-issuer component, allowing 120,000 wETH to be minted without a corresponding lock. This is a concrete counterexample to the implicit two-way classification and should either be analyzed or explicitly excluded with justification.
  3. [Section 5] The related-work section states that the paper 'focused on attacks that occurred from December 2022 until May 2023,' but the analyzed corpus includes Qubit (January 2022), Ronin (March 2022), and Wintermute (September 2022). The abstract says 2022 and 2023, the title says 2023, and the introduction says the work covers hacks after [4]; these statements are mutually inconsistent and leave the actual scope and selection criterion unclear.
  4. [Sections 3 and 4] No inclusion criteria or incident-selection methodology is provided for the six case studies. As a SoK, the paper should state how incidents were identified, screened, and validated; without this, the proposed classification and the claim that the findings can inform industry-wide standards are not fully supported, because the reader cannot assess whether the surveyed set is representative or complete.
minor comments (5)
  1. [Section 3.2.1] The text twice refers to the 'Merle root' rather than the 'Merkle root'.
  2. [Section 4.2.1] 'Stage Guardian Network' appears to be a typo for 'State Guardian Network'.
  3. [Section 4.1.3] 'Axie Infinitie's' should be 'Axie Infinity's'.
  4. [Section 4.1.3] The passage says the attacker 'gained control of five validator private keys,' but the following sentences explain that the Axie DAO validator's signature was obtained through the gas-free RPC node; the paper should clarify whether the key was compromised or only its signing capability was abused.
  5. [Title and Abstract] The title promises a review of hacks 'in 2023,' while the abstract and body cover 2022 and 2023; the wording should be aligned.

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged · score 2.0 of 10

No significant circularity: the paper applies an architecture from the authors' prior SoK, but the hack classifications are based on external public incidents and no prediction reduces to the framework's definitions.

full rationale

The claimed derivation chain is a classification review, not a parameterized model. Section 2 defines custodian, communicator, and debt-issuer components; Sections 3 and 4 assign several externally documented incidents to the first two categories. There are no fitted parameters, no equations, and no quantity is 'predicted' from the framework; the classifications are applications of a stated architectural model to independently reported exploit details. The only self-citation appears in Section 5: the paper 'continues the line of work initiated by Lee et al. [4]' and states that [4] 'set out a general bridge architecture design.' That prior work is a published IEEE SoK with its own analysis of documented hacks; it is not invoked as a uniqueness theorem, it does not forbid alternative taxonomies such as debt-issuer attacks, and the current paper's conclusions do not logically reduce to it. The absence of a debt-issuer attack section is a completeness limitation of the binary custodian/communicator organization, but it is not a circular reduction because the paper never claims the two categories are exhaustive by construction. Hence no circular step meeting the quoted-reduction standard is present; the self-citation is minor and non-load-bearing.

Assumptions & free parameters 0 free parameters · 3 assumptions · 0 invented entities

The paper introduces no free parameters and no new physical or conceptual entities. Its burden rests on the completeness of the component-based architecture and the accuracy of secondary incident reports, both of which are assumed rather than demonstrated.

assumptions (3)
  • domain assumption Cross-chain bridges can be decomposed into custodian, communicator, and debt issuer components.
    Section 2 introduces this architecture as the basis for all subsequent attack classification; it derives from Lee et al. [4] and is asserted, not empirically validated as complete or exclusive.
  • domain assumption The selected hacks are representative of bridge attack patterns.
    Section 1 describes the goal as analyzing recent hacks, but the paper gives no inclusion criteria for the seven incidents, so the taxonomy may miss other vulnerability classes (e.g., governance or debt-issuer-specific attacks).
  • domain assumption Public incident reports (rekt.news, threadreaderapp, Medium, company blogs) accurately describe the attacks.
    The case studies in Sections 3 and 4 rely on these secondary sources rather than primary on-chain evidence; this assumption is load-bearing and is undercut by the Wintermute date error in Section 3.3.1.

how reviews work

0 comments
Cite this review

Pith. "Pith review of SoK: A Review of Cross-Chain Bridge Hacks in 2023." pith.science (2026). https://pith.science/paper/EHNWI2CD

@misc{pith2026250103423,
  author       = {Pith},
  title        = {Pith review of: SoK: A Review of Cross-Chain Bridge Hacks in 2023},
  year         = {2026},
  howpublished = {\url{https://pith.science/paper/EHNWI2CD}},
  note         = {Machine review of arXiv:2501.03423}
}
abstract

Blockchain technology has revolutionized industries by enabling secure and decentralized transactions. However, the isolated nature of blockchain ecosystems hinders the seamless transfer of digital assets across different chains. Cross-chain bridges have emerged as vital web3 infrastructure to address this challenge by facilitating interoperability between distinct blockchains. Cross-chain bridges remain vulnerable to various attacks despite sophisticated designs and security measures. The industry has experienced a surge in bridge attacks, resulting in significant financial losses. The largest hack impacted Axie Infinity Ronin Bridge, with a loss of almost \$600 million USD. This paper analyzes recent cross-chain bridge hacks in 2022 and 2023 and examines the exploited vulnerabilities. By understanding the attack nature and underlying weaknesses, the paper aims to enhance bridge security and propose potential countermeasures. The findings contribute to developing industry-wide standards for bridge security and operational resilience. Addressing the vulnerabilities and weaknesses exploited in recent cross-chain bridge hacks fosters trust and confidence in cross-chain interoperability.

Figures

Figures reproduced from arXiv: 2501.03423 by the authors.

Figure 1
Figure 1. Cross-chain transfer from a source chain (Ethereum) to a destination chain (An [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p004_1.png] view at source ↗
Figure 2
Figure 2. Cross-chain transfer from a source chain (Another Chain) to a destination chain [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p004_2.png] view at source ↗
Figure 3
Figure 3. Overview of the normal interaction with the bridge using Merkle proofs. [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p007_3.png] view at source ↗
Figures from the paper (7 more)
Figure 4
Figure 4. Figure 4: An example of a Merkle Tree. The leaf nodes are [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p008_4.png]
Figure 5
Figure 5. Figure 5: Overview of the attack of the Binance Bridge. [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p009_5.png]
Figure 6
Figure 6. Figure 6: Overview of the attack of the Nomad Bridge. [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p011_6.png]
Figure 7
Figure 7. Figure 7: Overview of the attack of the Qubit Finance Bridge. [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p012_7.png]
Figure 8
Figure 8. Figure 8: General example of an admin controlled custodian contract, commonly used in a [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p013_8.png]
Figure 9
Figure 9. Figure 9: General implementation of a bridge with a five node communicator. [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p015_9.png]
Figure 10
Figure 10. Figure 10: Example of behavior of the Celer cross-chain protocol where the validator nodes [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p017_10.png]

Discussion (0). Continue with ORCID to comment.

Forward citations

Cited by 2 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. Hedge Funds on a Swamp: Analyzing Patterns, Vulnerabilities, and Defense Measures in Blockchain Bridges

    cs.ET 2025-07 conditional novelty 5.0 of 10

    A data-driven study of blockchain bridge attacks concludes that most losses come from trusted signer compromise and code validation bugs, while trustless designs have so far escaped major exploits.

  2. Towards Secure and Trustworthy DAOs for Cross-Chain Governance

    cs.CR 2026-07 reject novelty 3.0 of 10

    The paper proposes a layered, unvalidated security architecture for cross-chain DAO governance, folding known attacks and known cryptographic primitives into a new module diagram.

Reference graph

Works this paper leans on

45 extracted references · 45 canonical work pages · cited by 2 Pith papers

  1. [4]

    SoK: Not quite water under the bridge: Review of cross-chain bridge hacks

    Sung-Shine Lee, Alexandr Murashkin, Martin Derka, and Jan Gorzny. SoK: Not quite water under the bridge: Review of cross-chain bridge hacks. In IEEE International Con- ference on Blockchain and Cryptocurrency, ICBC 2023, Dubai, United Arab Emirates, May 1-5, 2023, pages 1–14. IEEE, 2023

    work page 2023

  2. [1]

    Ethereum: A secure decentralised generalised transaction ledger, 2014

    Gavin Wood. Ethereum: A secure decentralised generalised transaction ledger, 2014. https://ethereum.github.io/yellowpaper/paper.pdf

    work page 2014

  3. [2]

    Crypto research, data, and tools, Aug 2022

    Ally Zach. Crypto research, data, and tools, Aug 2022. https://messari.io/repor t/a-year-of-bridge-exploits

    work page 2022

  4. [3]

    Rekt - ronin network - rekt, Mar 2022

    Rekt news. Rekt - ronin network - rekt, Mar 2022. https://rekt.news/ronin-rekt/. 19

    work page 2022

  5. [5]

    ERC-20: Token standard, Nov 2015

    Vitalik Buterin Fabian Vogelsteller. ERC-20: Token standard, Nov 2015. https: //eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-20

    work page 2015

  6. [6]

    ERC-721: Non- fungible token standard, Jan 2018

    William Entriken, Dieter Shirley, Jacob Evans, and Nastassia Sachs. ERC-721: Non- fungible token standard, Jan 2018. https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-721

    work page 2018

  7. [7]

    ERC-1155: Multi token standard, Jun 2018

    Witek Radomski, Andrew Cooke, Philippe Castonguay, James Therien, Eric Binet, and Ronan Sandford. ERC-1155: Multi token standard, Jun 2018. https://eips.ethereu m.org/EIPS/eip-1155

    work page 2018

  8. [8]

    Commit-chains: Secure, scalable off-chain payments

    Rami Khalil, Alexei Zamyatin, Guillaume Felley, Pedro Moreno-Sanchez, and Arthur Gervais. Commit-chains: Secure, scalable off-chain payments. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2018/642, 2018. https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/642

    work page 2018

Show all 45 references
  1. [9]

    Ideal properties of rollup escape hatches

    Jan Gorzny, Po-An Lin, and Martin Derka. Ideal properties of rollup escape hatches. In Kaiwen Zhang, Abdelouahed Gherbi, and Paolo Bellavista, editors, Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Distributed Infrastructure for the Common Good, DICG 2022, Quebec, Quebec Ci...

    2022

  2. [10]

    On the size of pairing-based non-interactive arguments

    Jens Groth. On the size of pairing-based non-interactive arguments. In Marc Fischlin and Jean-S´ ebastien Coron, editors, Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2016 - 35th Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Vienna, Austria,...

    2016

  3. [11]

    zkBridge: Trustless cross-chain bridges made practical

    Tiancheng Xie, Jiaheng Zhang, Zerui Cheng, Fan Zhang, Yupeng Zhang, Yongzheng Jia, Dan Boneh, and Dawn Song. zkBridge: Trustless cross-chain bridges made practical. In Heng Yin, Angelos Stavrou, Cas Cremers, and Elaine Shi, editors, Proceedings of the 2022 ACM SIGSAC Conferenc...

    2022

  4. [12]

    Protocol overview, Mar 2023

    Telepathy. Protocol overview, Mar 2023. https://docs.telepathy.xyz/protocol/ overview

    2023

  5. [13]

    Menezes, Paul C

    Alfred J. Menezes, Paul C. van Oorschot, and Scott A. Vanstone. Handbook of Applied Cryptography. CRC Press, Dec 2018

    2018

  6. [14]

    Rekt - BNB Bridge - rekt, Oct 2022

    Rekt News. Rekt - BNB Bridge - rekt, Oct 2022. https://rekt.news/bnb-bridge-r ekt/

    2022

  7. [15]

    Analysis of the binance bridge hack

    samczsun. Analysis of the binance bridge hack. https://threadreaderapp.com/thre ad/1578167198203289600.html

  8. [16]

    Thread by @frankresearcher on binance hack, Oct 2022

    Igor Igambediev. Thread by @frankresearcher on binance hack, Oct 2022. https: //threadreaderapp.com/thread/1578148293032706048.html. 20

    2022

  9. [17]

    https://github.com/bnb-chain/bnc-tendermint-iavl

    GitHub - IA VL+ tree. https://github.com/bnb-chain/bnc-tendermint-iavl

  10. [18]

    Analysis of nomad hack, Aug 2022

    Zellic. Analysis of nomad hack, Aug 2022. https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1 554296729050025984.html

    2022

  11. [19]

    Analysis of nomad hack, Aug 2022

    samczsun. Analysis of nomad hack, Aug 2022. https://threadreaderapp.com/thre ad/1554252024723546112.html

    2022

  12. [20]

    https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.8.23/

    Solidity. https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.8.23/

  13. [21]

    Qubit bridge collapse exploited to the tune of $80 million

    CertiK. Qubit bridge collapse exploited to the tune of $80 million. Jan 2022. https: //certik.medium.com/qubit-bridge-collapse-exploited-to-the-tune-of-80-m illion-a7ab9068e1a0

    2022

  14. [22]

    Explained: The Qubit hack (January 2022), Jan 2022

    Rob Behnke. Explained: The Qubit hack (January 2022), Jan 2022. https://www.ha lborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-qubit-hack-january-2022

    2022

  15. [23]

    Hack track: Analysis of Qubit finance exploit, Feb 2022

    Merkle Science. Hack track: Analysis of Qubit finance exploit, Feb 2022. https: //blog.merklescience.com/hacktrack/analysis-of-qubit-finance-exploit

    2022

  16. [24]

    Protocol exploit report - Qubit finance

    Qubit Finance. Protocol exploit report - Qubit finance. Medium, Jan 2022. https: //medium.com/@QubitFin/protocol-exploit-report-305c34540fa3

    2022

  17. [25]

    https://github.com/bnb-chain/BEPs/blob /master/BEP20.md

    BEP-20 standard proposal, Aug 2020. https://github.com/bnb-chain/BEPs/blob /master/BEP20.md

    2020

  18. [26]

    SafeERC20

    OpenZeppelin. SafeERC20. https://docs.openzeppelin.com/contracts/4.x/api/ token/erc20#SafeERC20

  19. [27]

    Rekt - Wintermute - rekt 2, Sept 2022

    Rekt news. Rekt - Wintermute - rekt 2, Sept 2022. https://rekt.news/wintermute -rekt-2/

    2022

  20. [28]

    Explained: The Wintermute hack (September 2022), Sept 2022

    Rob Behnke. Explained: The Wintermute hack (September 2022), Sept 2022. https:// www.halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-wintermute-hack-september-2022

    2022

  21. [29]

    Profanity

    johguse. Profanity. https://github.com/johguse/profanity

  22. [30]

    A vulnerability disclosed in profanity, an ethereum vanity address tool

    1inch Network. A vulnerability disclosed in profanity, an ethereum vanity address tool. 1inch Network Blog, Sept 2022. https://blog.1inch.io/a-vulnerability-disclos ed-in-profanity-an-ethereum-vanity-address-tool/

    2022

  23. [31]

    Exploiting the profanity flaw - amber group - medium

    Amber Group. Exploiting the profanity flaw - amber group - medium. Amber Group, Sept 2022. https://medium.com/amber-group/exploiting-the-profanity-flaw-e 986576de7ab

    2022

  24. [32]

    Explained: The Harmony Horizon bridge hack, Jun 2022

    Rob Behnke. Explained: The Harmony Horizon bridge hack, Jun 2022. https://www. halborn.com/blog/post/explained-the-harmony-horizon-bridge-hack

    2022

  25. [33]

    An incident response update on the horizon bridge hack, Jun 2022

    Stephen Tse. An incident response update on the horizon bridge hack, Jun 2022. https: //threadreaderapp.com/thread/1540896630320246785.html. 21

    2022

  26. [34]

    Harmony bridge update, Jun 2022

    Rugdoc.io. Harmony bridge update, Jun 2022. https://threadreaderapp.com/thre ad/1540151942214651904.html

    2022

  27. [35]

    Hack track: Analysis of ronin network exploit, Mar 2022

    Merkle Science. Hack track: Analysis of ronin network exploit, Mar 2022. https: //blog.merklescience.com/hacktrack/hack-track-analysis-of-ronin-network -exploit-merkle-science

    2022

  28. [36]

    Election fraud? double voting in Celer’s state guardian network

    Felix Wilhelm. Election fraud? double voting in Celer’s state guardian network. Jump Crypto, May 2023. https://jumpcrypto.com/writing/election-fraud-double-v oting-in-celers-state-guardian-network/

    2023

  29. [37]

    Modeling cross- blockchain process using queueing theory: The case of cosmos

    Ou Wu, Shanshan Li, Yanze Wang, Haoming Li, and He Zhang. Modeling cross- blockchain process using queueing theory: The case of cosmos. In 28th IEEE Interna- tional Conference on Parallel and Distributed Systems, ICPADS 2022, Nanjing, China, January 10-12, 2023, pages 274–281....

    2022

  30. [38]

    Do you need a distributed ledger technology interoperability solution? Distributed Ledger Technologies: Research and Practice, 2(1):1–37, Mar 2023

    Rafael Belchior, Luke Riley, Thomas Hardjono, Andr´ e Vasconcelos, and Miguel Correia. Do you need a distributed ledger technology interoperability solution? Distributed Ledger Technologies: Research and Practice, 2(1):1–37, Mar 2023

    2023

  31. [39]

    An overview on cross-chain: Mechanism, platforms, challenges and advances

    Wei Ou, Shiying Huang, Jingjing Zheng, Qionglu Zhang, Guang Zeng, and Wenbao Han. An overview on cross-chain: Mechanism, platforms, challenges and advances. Computer Networks, 218:109378, 2022. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/ article/pii/S1389128622004121

    2022

  32. [40]

    Knottenbelt

    Alexei Zamyatin, Mustafa Al-Bassam, Dionysis Zindros, Eleftherios Kokoris-Kogias, Pedro Moreno-Sanchez, Aggelos Kiayias, and William J. Knottenbelt. SoK: Communi- cation across distributed ledgers. In Nikita Borisov and Claudia D ´ ıaz, editors, Finan- cial Cryptography and Da...

    2021

  33. [41]

    Xscope: Hunting for cross-chain bridge attacks

    Jiashuo Zhang, Jianbo Gao, Yue Li, Ziming Chen, Zhi Guan, and Zhong Chen. Xscope: Hunting for cross-chain bridge attacks. In 37th IEEE/ACM International Conference on Automated Software Engineering, ASE 2022, Rochester, MI, USA, October 10-14, 2022, pages 171:1–171:4. ACM, 2022

    2022

  34. [42]

    Hephaestus: Modelling, Analysis, and Performance Evaluation of Cross-Chain Transactions

    Rafael Belchior, Peter Somogyvari, Jonas Pfannschmid, Andr´ e Vasconcelos, and Miguel Correia. Hephaestus: Modelling, Analysis, and Performance Evaluation of Cross-Chain Transactions. Jan 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.36227/techrxiv.20718058.v2

    2023 doi

  35. [43]

    Hyper- ledger cactus whitepaper, Mar 2022

    Hart Montgomery, Hugo Borne-Pons, Jonathan Hamilton, Mic Bowman, Peter Somo- gyvari, Shingo Fujimoto, Takuma Takeuchi, Tracy Kuhrt, and Rafael Belchior. Hyper- ledger cactus whitepaper, Mar 2022. https://github.com/hyperledger/cacti/blo b/main/whitepaper/whitepaper.md

    2022

  36. [44]

    Crosschain risk framework, Dec 2022

    Arjun Chand, Ermyas Abebe, and David Hyland-Wood. Crosschain risk framework, Dec 2022. https://crosschainriskframework.github.io/framework/20categori es/categories-of-risk/. 22

    2022

  37. [45]

    L2bridge risk framework, 2022

    Bartek Kiepuszewski. L2bridge risk framework, 2022. https://gov.l2beat.com/t/l 2bridge-risk-framework/. 23

    2022

Pith tools

Reviewed August 10, 2026 · model on record in the stance chip above.