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PolicyCleanse: Backdoor Detection and Mitigation in Reinforcement Learning

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arxiv 2202.03609 v5 pith:2UZZYFZZ submitted 2022-02-08 cs.LG cs.AI

classification cs.LGcs.AI
keywords backdooragentstrojanlearningpolicycleansereinforcementtriggeractions
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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While real-world applications of reinforcement learning are becoming popular, the security and robustness of RL systems are worthy of more attention and exploration. In particular, recent works have revealed that, in a multi-agent RL environment, backdoor trigger actions can be injected into a victim agent (a.k.a. Trojan agent), which can result in a catastrophic failure as soon as it sees the backdoor trigger action. To ensure the security of RL agents against malicious backdoors, in this work, we propose the problem of Backdoor Detection in a multi-agent competitive reinforcement learning system, with the objective of detecting Trojan agents as well as the corresponding potential trigger actions, and further trying to mitigate their Trojan behavior. In order to solve this problem, we propose PolicyCleanse that is based on the property that the activated Trojan agents accumulated rewards degrade noticeably after several timesteps. Along with PolicyCleanse, we also design a machine unlearning-based approach that can effectively mitigate the detected backdoor. Extensive experiments demonstrate that the proposed methods can accurately detect Trojan agents, and outperform existing backdoor mitigation baseline approaches by at least 3% in winning rate across various types of agents and environments.

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Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. Fox in the Henhouse: Supply-Chain Backdoor Attacks Against Reinforcement Learning

    cs.LG 2025-05 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    A malicious pre-trained opponent can, through legitimate in-game actions, embed a trigger-activated backdoor into a victim reinforcement learning agent.

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