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Empirical Game-Theoretic Analysis: A Survey
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In the empirical approach to game-theoretic analysis (EGTA), the model of the game comes not from declarative representation, but is derived by interrogation of a procedural description of the game environment. The motivation for developing this approach was to enable game-theoretic reasoning about strategic situations too complex for analytic specification and solution. Since its introduction over twenty years ago, EGTA has been applied to a wide range of multiagent domains, from auctions and markets to recreational games to cyber-security. We survey the extensive methodology developed for EGTA over the years, organized by the elemental subproblems comprising the EGTA process. We describe key EGTA concepts and techniques, and the questions at the frontier of EGTA research. Recent advances in machine learning have accelerated progress in EGTA, and promise to significantly expand our capacities for reasoning about complex game situations.
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