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Concealed Data Poisoning Attacks on NLP Models

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arxiv 2010.12563 v2 pith:6434FX4X submitted 2020-10-23 cs.CL

classification cs.CL
keywords modelattackdatapoisonpredictionsattackscoffeeconcealed
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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Adversarial attacks alter NLP model predictions by perturbing test-time inputs. However, it is much less understood whether, and how, predictions can be manipulated with small, concealed changes to the training data. In this work, we develop a new data poisoning attack that allows an adversary to control model predictions whenever a desired trigger phrase is present in the input. For instance, we insert 50 poison examples into a sentiment model's training set that causes the model to frequently predict Positive whenever the input contains "James Bond". Crucially, we craft these poison examples using a gradient-based procedure so that they do not mention the trigger phrase. We also apply our poison attack to language modeling ("Apple iPhone" triggers negative generations) and machine translation ("iced coffee" mistranslated as "hot coffee"). We conclude by proposing three defenses that can mitigate our attack at some cost in prediction accuracy or extra human annotation.

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Cited by 4 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. Pretraining Data Can Be Poisoned through Computational Propaganda

    cs.AI 2026-07 conditional novelty 7.0 of 10

    Public comment sections are a measurable, low-cost vector for injecting poison into web-scale language-model pretraining data.

  2. A Red Teaming Framework for Large Language Models: A Case Study on Faithfulness Evaluation

    cs.CL 2026-06 unverdicted novelty 5.0 of 10

    Introduces a multi-role red teaming framework using attacker and jury models that increases attack success rates by up to 7.9% on LLM faithfulness in question-answering tasks.

  3. A Systematic Review of Poisoning Attacks Against Large Language Models

    cs.CR 2025-06 conditional novelty 5.0 of 10

    A systematic review that organizes 65 LLM poisoning papers into a threat model with four attack specifications and generalized metrics.

  4. A Survey on Data Security in Large Language Models

    cs.CR 2025-08 conditional novelty 2.0 of 10

    A survey of data security risks in LLMs that organizes threats, defenses, and evaluation datasets, with notable factual errors in its tables.

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