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Enhancing Fine-Tuning Based Backdoor Defense with Sharpness-Aware Minimization

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arxiv 2304.11823 v1 pith:C5T4XVDU submitted 2023-04-24 cs.AI

classification cs.AI
keywords defensefine-tuningbackdoorneuronsaimsbackdooredbackdoorrelatedbenign
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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Backdoor defense, which aims to detect or mitigate the effect of malicious triggers introduced by attackers, is becoming increasingly critical for machine learning security and integrity. Fine-tuning based on benign data is a natural defense to erase the backdoor effect in a backdoored model. However, recent studies show that, given limited benign data, vanilla fine-tuning has poor defense performance. In this work, we provide a deep study of fine-tuning the backdoored model from the neuron perspective and find that backdoorrelated neurons fail to escape the local minimum in the fine-tuning process. Inspired by observing that the backdoorrelated neurons often have larger norms, we propose FTSAM, a novel backdoor defense paradigm that aims to shrink the norms of backdoor-related neurons by incorporating sharpness-aware minimization with fine-tuning. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our method on several benchmark datasets and network architectures, where it achieves state-of-the-art defense performance. Overall, our work provides a promising avenue for improving the robustness of machine learning models against backdoor attacks.

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Cited by 2 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. Where Do Backdoors Live? A Component-Level Analysis of Backdoor Propagation in Speech Language Models

    cs.CL 2025-10 unverdicted novelty 6.0 of 10

    Backdoors propagate through SLM components with persistence or erasure depending on the targeted part, and poisoned samples are not directly separable from benign ones in shared multitask embeddings.

  2. A Robust Attack: Displacement Backdoor Attack

    cs.CR 2025-02 conditional novelty 4.0 of 10

    Displacement Backdoor Attack blends shifted self-copies of an image into the original as a backdoor trigger and reportedly maintains high attack success under data augmentation.

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