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Can LLMs Separate Instructions From Data? And What Do We Even Mean By That?

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arxiv 2403.06833 v3 pith:L5NTEEB6 submitted 2024-03-11 cs.LG cs.CL

classification cs.LGcs.CL
keywords separationllmsmodelsdatadatasetfailinstruction-datainstructions
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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Instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs) show impressive results in numerous practical applications, but they lack essential safety features that are common in other areas of computer science, particularly an explicit separation of instructions and data. This makes them vulnerable to manipulations such as indirect prompt injections and generally unsuitable for safety-critical tasks. Surprisingly, there is currently no established definition or benchmark to quantify this phenomenon. In this work, we close this gap by introducing a formal measure for instruction-data separation and an empirical variant that is calculable from a model's outputs. We also present a new dataset, SEP, that allows estimating the measure for real-world models. Our results on various LLMs show that the problem of instruction-data separation is real: all models fail to achieve high separation, and canonical mitigation techniques, such as prompt engineering and fine-tuning, either fail to substantially improve separation or reduce model utility. The source code and SEP dataset are openly accessible at https://github.com/egozverev/Shold-It-Be-Executed-Or-Processed.

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Cited by 2 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. Simple Prompt Injection Attacks Can Leak Personal Data Observed by LLM Agents During Task Execution

    cs.CR 2025-06 conditional novelty 5.0 of 10

    Prompt injection can make LLM agents leak personal data they observed while executing tasks, with measured attack success rates around 15-20 percent and password leakage much rarer.

  2. Design Patterns for Securing LLM Agents against Prompt Injections

    cs.LG 2025-06 conditional novelty 4.0 of 10

    Six composable design patterns (action-selector, plan-then-execute, map-reduce, dual LLM, code-then-execute, context-minimization) constrain LLM agents so prompt-injected text cannot reach consequential actions.

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