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Random Gradient Masking as a Defensive Measure to Deep Leakage in Federated Learning

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arxiv 2408.08430 v1 pith:N4X6J7BY submitted 2024-08-15 cs.LG cs.CR

classification cs.LGcs.CR
keywords maskingdefensivelearningwhileclientsclippingdeepevaluate
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Federated Learning(FL), in theory, preserves privacy of individual clients' data while producing quality machine learning models. However, attacks such as Deep Leakage from Gradients(DLG) severely question the practicality of FL. In this paper, we empirically evaluate the efficacy of four defensive methods against DLG: Masking, Clipping, Pruning, and Noising. Masking, while only previously studied as a way to compress information during parameter transfer, shows surprisingly robust defensive utility when compared to the other three established methods. Our experimentation is two-fold. We first evaluate the minimum hyperparameter threshold for each method across MNIST, CIFAR-10, and lfw datasets. Then, we train FL clients with each method and their minimum threshold values to investigate the trade-off between DLG defense and training performance. Results reveal that Masking and Clipping show near to none degradation in performance while obfuscating enough information to effectively defend against DLG.

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Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. SMTFL: Secure Model Training to Untrusted Participants in Federated Learning

    cs.CR 2025-02 reject novelty 5.0 of 10

    An FL scheme combining client grouping, gradient splitting, performance-based malicious detection, and threshold encryption aims to resist gradient inversion and poisoning attacks, claiming over 95% malicious-client l...

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