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Intention Analysis Makes LLMs A Good Jailbreak Defender
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abstract
Aligning large language models (LLMs) with human values, particularly when facing complex and stealthy jailbreak attacks, presents a formidable challenge. Unfortunately, existing methods often overlook this intrinsic nature of jailbreaks, which limits their effectiveness in such complex scenarios. In this study, we present a simple yet highly effective defense strategy, i.e., Intention Analysis ($\mathbb{IA}$). $\mathbb{IA}$ works by triggering LLMs' inherent self-correct and improve ability through a two-stage process: 1) analyzing the essential intention of the user input, and 2) providing final policy-aligned responses based on the first round conversation. Notably, $\mathbb{IA}$ is an inference-only method, thus could enhance LLM safety without compromising their helpfulness. Extensive experiments on varying jailbreak benchmarks across a wide range of LLMs show that $\mathbb{IA}$ could consistently and significantly reduce the harmfulness in responses (averagely -48.2% attack success rate). Encouragingly, with our $\mathbb{IA}$, Vicuna-7B even outperforms GPT-3.5 regarding attack success rate. We empirically demonstrate that, to some extent, $\mathbb{IA}$ is robust to errors in generated intentions. Further analyses reveal the underlying principle of $\mathbb{IA}$: suppressing LLM's tendency to follow jailbreak prompts, thereby enhancing safety.
Forward citations
Cited by 4 Pith papers
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SoK: Systematizing LLM Prompt Security: Taxonomies, Datasets, and Unified Evaluation of Attacks and Defenses
A systemization of LLM jailbreak security that adds linked taxonomies, an evaluation platform, and JailbreakDB, while its main attack–defense comparison results remain deferred.
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The Energy Loss Phenomenon in RLHF: A New Perspective on Mitigating Reward Hacking
Increasing energy loss in an LLM's final layer during RLHF is linked to reward hacking, and penalizing that loss (EPPO) reduces hacking and improves RLHF quality.
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When LLM Defenses Backfire: Characterizing Safety, Performance, and Cost Trade-offs
Across 11 defenses, 6 open LLMs, and multiple benchmarks, rule-based defenses best preserve task accuracy, conservative self-reflection drives over-refusal, and multi-round defenses dominate inference cost.
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Beyond Surface-Level Detection: Towards Cognitive-Driven Defense Against Jailbreak Attacks via Meta-Operations Reasoning
A jailbreak defense that reasons about hidden manipulations in attack prompts, trained with supervised fine-tuning plus entropy-guided reinforcement learning, generalizes to attacks never seen in training.
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