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Thresholds quantifying proportionality criteria for election methods
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We define several different thresholds for election methods by considering different scenarios, corresponding to different proportionality criteria that have been proposed by various authors. In particular, we reformulate the criteria known as DPC, PSC, JR, PJR, EJR in our setting. We consider multi-winner election methods of different types, using ballots with unordered lists of candidates or ordered lists, and for comparison also methods using only party lists. The thresholds are calculated for many different election methods. The considered methods include classical ones such as BV, SNTV and STV (with some results going back to e.g. Droop and Dodgson in the 19th century); we also study in detail several perhaps lesser known methods by Phragm\'en and Thiele. There are also many cases left as open problems.
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Proportionality in Practice: Quantifying Proportionality in Ordinal Elections
The authors define α-parameterized versions of four proportionality axioms and show on 1,070 real Scottish elections that solid coalitions are rarely large enough for classic PSC to bind, with SNTV matching STV under ...
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