242 unfold winner 243 by_cases h : v₀ ≥ v₁ 244 · exact Or.inl ⟨if_pos h, h⟩ 245 · push_neg at h 246 refine Or.inr ⟨?_, h⟩ 247 rw [if_neg (by linarith : ¬ v₀ ≥ v₁)] 248 249/-! ## §5. Truthful bidding is a Nash equilibrium -/ 250 251/-- **TRUTHFUL BIDDING IS A NASH EQUILIBRIUM.** No agent gains by 252unilaterally deviating from truthful bidding. (This is weaker than 253DSIC, but is the standard solution-concept statement.) -/
used by (1)
From the project-wide theorem graph. These declarations reference this one in their body.