structure
definition
VCGCert
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IndisputableMonolith.GameTheory.MechanismDesignFromSigma on GitHub at line 311.
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depends on
-
sigma_conservation -
is -
is -
is -
payment₀ -
payment₁ -
pivot_identity -
sigma_cost_to_agent_0 -
sigma_cost_to_agent_1 -
truthful_is_nash -
utility₀ -
utility₁ -
winner -
is
used by
formal source
308This is not a trivial-branch lemma; the DSIC proofs cover all four
309cases (truthful wins / loses × deviation wins / loses) over the full
310real bid space. -/
311structure VCGCert where
312 dsic_zero : ∀ (v₀ b₁ b₀' : ℝ), utility₀ v₀ b₀' b₁ ≤ utility₀ v₀ v₀ b₁
313 dsic_one : ∀ (v₁ b₀ b₁' : ℝ), utility₁ v₁ b₀ b₁' ≤ utility₁ v₁ b₀ v₁
314 truthful_is_nash :
315 ∀ (v₀ v₁ : ℝ),
316 (∀ b₀' : ℝ, utility₀ v₀ b₀' v₁ ≤ utility₀ v₀ v₀ v₁) ∧
317 (∀ b₁' : ℝ, utility₁ v₁ v₀ b₁' ≤ utility₁ v₁ v₀ v₁)
318 pivot_identity :
319 ∀ (v₀ v₁ : ℝ),
320 (v₀ ≥ v₁ → payment₀ v₀ v₁ = v₁) ∧
321 (v₀ < v₁ → payment₁ v₀ v₁ = v₀)
322 sigma_conservation :
323 ∀ (v₀ v₁ : ℝ),
324 utility₀ v₀ v₀ v₁ + utility₁ v₁ v₀ v₁ +
325 (payment₀ v₀ v₁ + payment₁ v₀ v₁) = max v₀ v₁
326 payment_eq_sigma_cost :
327 ∀ (v₀ v₁ : ℝ),
328 (v₀ ≥ v₁ → payment₀ v₀ v₁ = sigma_cost_to_agent_0 v₁) ∧
329 (v₀ < v₁ → payment₁ v₀ v₁ = sigma_cost_to_agent_1 v₀)
330 welfare_optimal :
331 ∀ (v₀ v₁ : ℝ),
332 (winner v₀ v₁ = 0 ∧ v₀ ≥ v₁) ∨ (winner v₀ v₁ = 1 ∧ v₀ < v₁)
333
334/-- The master certificate is inhabited. -/
335def vcgCert : VCGCert where
336 dsic_zero := dsic_agent_zero
337 dsic_one := dsic_agent_one
338 truthful_is_nash := truthful_is_nash
339 pivot_identity := pivot_identity
340 sigma_conservation := sigma_conservation_truthful
341 payment_eq_sigma_cost := vcg_payment_eq_sigma_cost