An eco-evolutionary model using adaptive dynamics shows overuse and underuse arise as alternative evolutionary outcomes depending on whether provisioning benefits increase concavely or convexly.
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In a two-agent public goods model with unequal endowments and logarithmic preferences, three barriers prevent voluntary Kantian cooperation: non-Pareto improvement for the poor under high inequality, parametrization choice as a source of distributional conflict, and coordination failure on a continu
A game-theoretic model demonstrates a Nash equilibrium in which authors voluntarily accept random pre-review rejection to reduce reviewer burden and raise evaluation quality.
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An eco-evolutionary model using adaptive dynamics shows overuse and underuse arise as alternative evolutionary outcomes depending on whether provisioning benefits increase concavely or convexly.
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In a two-agent public goods model with unequal endowments and logarithmic preferences, three barriers prevent voluntary Kantian cooperation: non-Pareto improvement for the poor under high inequality, parametrization choice as a source of distributional conflict, and coordination failure on a continu
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A game-theoretic model demonstrates a Nash equilibrium in which authors voluntarily accept random pre-review rejection to reduce reviewer burden and raise evaluation quality.
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