Revenue of any ε-approximate correlated equilibrium in discrete first-price auctions is at least v₂ - Θ(1/k) - Θ(ε k²).
Efficient Φ-regret minimization with low-degree swap deviations in extensive-form games.CoRR, abs/2402.09670, 2024
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Revenue Guarantees of No-Swap-Regret Dynamics in First Price Auctions
Revenue of any ε-approximate correlated equilibrium in discrete first-price auctions is at least v₂ - Θ(1/k) - Θ(ε k²).